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Abstract
This thesis will examine the relationship between the number and size of U.S. military bases in the Middle
East and instances of terrorism in the same region. It seeks to analyze the complex set of impacts that U.S.
military presence has on the area and determine if U.S. presence is overall more helpful or harmful to the
situation on the ground. While size and number of U.S. bases is not a perfect measure of U.S. presence, it is
a fair representation and a useful empirical starting point. This thesis will focus specifically on terrorism as
a non-state actor and not on state-sponsored terrorism. Using quantitative data to find general correlations,
this research will examine whether U.S. presence in the area is correlated with more or less terrorist attacks
and provide possible explanations for both outcomes. Building from this statistical analysis, the research
will then look in-depth at five case studies in order to examine this relationship more closely: Iraq,
Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Turkey. By examining the U.S. base’s size, community
engagement, and relationship with local militaries in these cases, the research will allow a richer discussion
regarding the effect of military bases on instances of terrorist violence. As these military bases represent a
significant portion of U.S. resources, it is important to look at their impact more carefully and in a more
nuanced way. This thesis will speak to ending the war on terror in the Middle East and discuss how the
U.S. military can better contribute to establishing peaceful, democratic governments in the region strong
enough to protect its people.
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Introduction:
Since the tragedy of September 11th, the question of our national security has
become preeminent throughout the nation. Phrases such as ‘the global war on terror,’
‘Islamist radicalism,’ and ‘lone wolf attack’ are becoming commonplace, as everyone
wonders whether or not any of us are safe. Many raise the question: how do we win the
global war on terror? Posing such a question forces one to make several critical
assumptions. First, it assumes that this war can be won at all. This means an understanding
of what conditions or event would signal one side having won, which assumes that the
other side had lost. Additionally, it requires a line to be drawn in the sand, in order to
determine concretely who is on which side or how many sides there in fact are. The
question also necessitates a definition for the term ‘we.’ ‘We’ the United States is different
from ‘we’ the West or ‘we’ the developed world or ‘we’ everyone who is not a terrorist.
Which raises the final quandary; how does one define a terrorist? Is it only those who have
committed acts of terrorism, or does the term include all those who might eventually
become sympathetic to the radical cause?
Because of the many caveats needed to answer the vital question, “How do we win
the war on terror?” I choose rather to analyze the effectiveness of a counterterrorism
strategy that is already in place and has been for a considerable amount of time. In this
paper, I will evaluate if the presence of U.S. troops abroad, as measured by number and
size of military bases in Middle Eastern countries, is correlated with a decrease in terrorist
attacks as intended, or if increased U.S. military presence correlates to an increase in
radicalization and terrorist activity, as measured by the number of terrorist attacks
quantified by the Global Terrorism Database. This paper begins by first outlining my
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methodology, then analyzing public opinion in order to pinpoint the American public’s
perspective on the effectiveness of different types of counterterrorism. Next, this paper will
emphasize that terrorism is not supported by the true Islamic faith and will then summarize
and synthesize leading scholarly conclusions in the literature review. Finally, my research
examines instances of terrorism in 5 specific countries in the Middle East where the U.S.
military presence has varied in recent years: Afghanistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and
Turkey. This section also considers the perspectives of the soldiers on the ground, in order
to highlight a more individualized account of the relationship between U.S. military
presence and instances of terrorism in the Middle East. This paper concludes by arguing
that we should care about the swift and just resolution of the threat posed by terrorism
because it is our moral responsibility to do so and will offer possible solutions to achieve
this end.

Methodology:
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether or not any correlation exists
between U.S. military presence and either an increase or decrease in terrorism. In order to
achieve this purpose, I employ a mixed-method approach, combining quantitative and
qualitative data, as well as primary and secondary sources. In this analysis, I will focus
only on terrorism committed by non-state actors, and not on state-sponsored terrorism. For
the purposes of this research, instances of terrorist activities within each country are
analyzed using the research of the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). As of today, the
database includes cases from 1970 until 2016, and currently includes more than 170,000
instances of terrorism worldwide (Global Terrorism Database 2017). The GTD is the most
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comprehensive, unclassified database cataloguing terrorist activities throughout the world,
and includes information on the type of attack, the group responsible, the date, location,
weapon used, and intended target. Begun by retired Air Force researchers under the name
Pinkerton Global Intelligence Services (PGIS), the project continues today through the
University of Maryland. All the information of the GTD is verified and checked for
accuracy from a variety of open media sources such as news websites, data sets, books,
journals, and legal documents (Global terrorism Database 2017). This paper utilizes the
GTD to measure increases or decreases of terrorism within a country over time because it
is the most all-inclusive, open source data available on the subject.
These increases or decreases of terrorism are then compared with changing U.S.
military presence within each country, as measured by the opening or closing of military
bases as well as troop levels, when available. Military presence is a dynamic concept and
can be measured in various ways. Some scholars use the term ‘Global Posture.’ As Figure
1 shows, Global Posture is comprised of more than just troops on the ground, it is also
affected by personnel, facilities, treaties, agreements, and statuses of foreign agreements
(SOFA’s) (Lostumbo, 2013, 6). I have chosen to analyze military bases because there is
not sufficient open source data available regarding exact U.S. troop numbers to adequately
conduct this type of research. Most of the information regarding U.S. bases comes from
government websites, such as the United States Air Force website, the Department of State
website, and the CIA World Factbook. When available, I have employed data from the
Congressional Research Service and peer-reviewed articles to supplement this data, but
unfortunately this data is infrequent and not always up to date.
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U.S. Global Posture (Figure 1)

Source: Lostumbo, Michael. RAND Report.

One way to shed light on the relationship between U.S. troop movement and
instances of terrorism is to look at the empirical data. The GTD complies detailed graphs
of terrorist instances, and when available, this paper also includes graphs of U.S. troop
presence within the country. When information on troop movements is less available, this
paper includes information as to when the U.S. entered the country, when the U.S. left (if
applicable), when military bases were built or closed, and when the most troops were
stationed in the country. Moreover, I will include survey data from both military and public
opinion sources. Most of the public opinion polls included are from Gallup and are
pertinent in that they provide a small sampling of American civilian opinion on this
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international issue. Military opinion is included because to discuss an issue so intrinsically
tied to military service and not include the opinion of those most affected by this issue
would be not only a grave misstep and incredibly naïve but would also be an insult to those
who defend our country every day.
Additionally, the reader will note that I refer to ‘Islamist’ terrorists or terrorism,
rather than ‘Islamic’ terrorists or terrorism. This is because none of the violence perpetrated
by these extremists is at all Muslim or Islamic. Radical terrorists are no more Muslims than
members of the Ku Klux Klan were Christians. Throughout this research, I try to make this
distinction abundantly clear, and correct the all too common misconception that Islam is
anything other than a religion of peace.

Public Opinion:
The opinion of the American people is an important aspect of the issue of
counterterrorism because terrorism affects civilians as well as military personnel. While
partisan lines divide Americans on many key issues, it is worth noting that both Democrats
and Republicans support U.S. military intervention in the Middle East to fight ISIS.
“Notably, there is little partisan difference in opinions of the U.S. military action, with 64%
of Democrats and 65% of Republicans approving. Independents are somewhat less likely
to approve, but a majority (55%) still do” (Gallup 2014) (See Figure 2). Approximately
34% of Americans say they follow ISIS’s actions on the news “very closely,” and 41% say
they follow it “somewhat closely.” (Gallup 2014). In addition, “Approval of the U.S.
military action is significantly higher among those following it very or somewhat closely”
(Gallup 2014). This detail is compelling because it shows that those who are informed
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about the terrorism in the Middle East are more likely to support America’s actions to
combat it.
Furthermore, while party alliances divide the American public on community,
private, social and economic issues, not to mention political ones, the majority of both
parties are in accord on this critical issue regarding U.S. military intervention to combat
ISIS. These results also indicate that military action is perceived as successful, or at least
as a viable option for combatting terrorism, to the American public because those following
the issues realize the threat posed by ISIS and agree that the U.S. military is an effective
means of combatting the threat.

Approval Ratings of U.S. Military Action Against ISIS by Party (Figure 2)

Source: http://news.gallup.com/poll/177263/slightly-fewer-back-isis-military-action-past-actions.aspx

Partisanship comes back into play when discussing the use of ground troops, however, with
Republicans being twice as likely to back the use of ground troops than Democrats. Thus,
it is important to clarify what is meant by ‘military action.’ For some, this can mean an
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aerial assault or drone warfare, while for others, it is infantry patrolling the streets.
Nevertheless, this overall American support for U.S. military action against ISIS is a rare
instance in which both Republicans and Democrats are in agreement.
In another Gallup poll from December of 2015, Americans were asked which of 11
ways to combat terrorism they perceived as most effective. The vast majority of Americans
surveyed, 79%, said that increased airstrikes against ISIS were somewhat or very effective
(See Figure 3). Sending more U.S. special forces to fight ISIS was seen as somewhat or
very effective by 70% of those surveyed, and 59% said that sending more ground troops to
the Middle East to fight ISIS would be at least somewhat effective. For each of these
military options, more than half of Americans surveyed believe that they are valid actions
to take to combat terrorism (See Figures 3-4). “The study includes four proposals related
to the use of military action against the Islamic State. More than half of Americans see all
as potentially effective” (Gallup 2015). While the average American in all probability has
not traveled to the Middle East to see any of these strategies implemented, it is noteworthy
that most Americans see our military as an effective means for fighting terrorism.
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Public Opinion of Counter Terrorism Strategies (Figure 3)

Source: Gallup.
http://www.gallup.com/poll/187682/anti-terror-visa-control-airstrikes-seeneffective.aspx?g_source=sussess+of+troops+on+the+gound&g_medium=search&g_campaign=tiles

Of the above choices, the first, fourth, fifth, and seventh most supported options
involve military actions, including air strikes, special forces, ground troops, and support
for local militaries. The other approaches focus on nonmilitary means such as visas, gun
sales, diplomacy and legislation. The last three options are significant in that they
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specifically single out Muslims in relation to combatting terrorism. For many, banning all
those who identify as Muslims from entering the U.S. or forcing all Muslims to wear
special identifications strays dangerously close to Nazi-era tactics. Fortunately, less than
38% of Americans surveyed supported any of those options, signaling that the majority of
Americans understand that terrorism and Islam are not equivalent.
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Public Opinion of Effectiveness of Counter Terrorism Strategies (Figure 4)

Source:
http://www.gallup.com/poll/187682/anti-terror-visa-control-airstrikes-seeneffective.aspx?g_source=sussess+of+troops+on+the+gound&g_medium=search&g_campaign=tiles
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When looking at the precise breakdown, 46% of those surveyed believed that
creating more strict screening procedures for those attempting to enter the U.S, whether
temporarily or to apply for a visa, would be the most effective way to combat terrorism
(see Figure 4). This is a non-military action and the wording does not specifically single
out Muslims. The solution does not take into account, however, how harsher immigration
policies would negatively affect refugees, especially children, the elderly, and the sick. It
also does not define what “tighter screening” would entail and how much extra time it
would take. On the opposite end of the spectrum, over half of Americans surveyed, 52%,
believe that instituting a religious test to those wishing to enter the country and banning all
those who identify as Muslim would not be effective at all. This is a logical conclusion, as
immigrants could easily lie about their religious leanings, and because Islam is not
synonymous with terrorism.

Islam and Terrorism:
While the violence incurred by acts of terrorism is appalling, it is important to note
that these terrorists and their actions are not representative of Islam. At its root, Islam is a
peaceful religion founded on equality and love. The word ‘Islam’ is itself based in the word
‘salaam,’ which means ‘peace.’ Terrorists today have misconstrued sacred texts and
scriptures to meet their political ends. Upon further research into the Quran and the works
of revered Islamic theologians and scholars, it is plain to see that true Muslims abhor the
violence being perpetrated in their name. Additionally, “the vast majority of Al Qaeda’s
victims are Muslims” (Groves 2012, 29). True followers of a religion would never support
any group who openly kills civilians, much less adherents of their own beliefs. Moreover,
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“85 percent of Al Qaeda’s victims from 2004 to 2008 were from Muslim majority countries
. . . Despite Al Qaeda’s attempted justiﬁcation of these attacks and suicide tactics, the
killing of innocent people, the targeting of other Muslims, and suicide are all forbidden in
the Koran” (Groves 2012, 37). Put simply, a Muslim is not more prone to be a terrorist than
any other individual.
One common term found in the narrative of terrorism is the word ‘jihad.’ While
radical groups have used this term to justify fighting their holy war against ‘American
infidels,’ its true definition is not at all violent. As John Esposito of Georgetown University
states, “In its most general sense, jihad in the Quran and in Muslim practice refers to the
obligation of all Muslims to strive (jihad, self-exertion) or struggle to follow God’s will”
(Esposito 2016, 40). This includes personal development and having a close personal
relationship with God, as well as spreading “God’s rule and law through teaching,
preaching, and, where necessary, armed struggle” (Esposito 2016, 40). But contrary to
popular belief, the conquests of the Muslim world centuries ago sought not to force
conversions to Islam, but to expand the reign and scope of the Muslim empire. It was
actually economically advantageous for the Arab empire if the conquered peoples did not
convert to Islam, because non-Muslims paid a higher tax than Muslims did.
“The Muslim conquests were neither for the sole purpose of conversion nor
annihilating the infidel. In addition to the fact that non-Muslims paid higher
taxes – and thus non-conversion operated to the financial advantage of the
state – the rules of jihad stipulated that non-Muslims remained free to
practice their religion upon payment of the so-called jizya, or ‘income-tax,’
in exchange for which the Muslim state incurred the responsibility to protect
them from outside attack” (Jackson 2007, 400).
Not only were non-Muslims free to practice the religion of their choosing, but they were
also protected by the Muslim Empire, allowing them to live in peace.
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While Islam is a political religion by nature, the aim of its political involvement is
to establish just and virtuous societies. Islam was founded on the principle of equality,
because Muhammad sought to close the social and economic gaps present in society.
“Guided by the word of God and the Prophet, the Muslim community has a mission to
create a moral social order: ‘You are the best community evolved for mankind, enjoying
what is right and forbidding what is wrong’ (3:110)” (Esposito 2016, 31). While it is
encouraged for Muslims to be politically active, the aim of this political activism is not to
bring violence to a nation or to eliminate other religions. Rather, its goal is to establish just
societies that help the poor and less fortunate.
By striving to create just societies, Muslims also seek to achieve peace. Sherman
Jackson, a renowned scholar of Arabic and Islamic studies, states that Islam is in fact a
peaceful religion. By this, he means that “contrary to the belief that Islam can only accept
a world that is entirely populated by Muslims and, as such, Muslims must, as a religious
duty, wage perpetual jihad against non-Muslims, Islam can peacefully coexist with nonMuslims” (Jackson 2007, 401). First, he says, that Arabs and Muslims of that time were
constantly in a state of war, which is why the Quran references fighting so frequently. But,
“one of the most consistent Quranic criticisms of [Muslims] is directed at their
unwillingness to fight” (Jackson 2007, 397). So, while the sacred Muslims texts do mention
violence and war, it is only because they were addressing the current state of affairs.
“Moreover, peace, i.e., the repelling of aggression, rather than conversion to Islam was the
ultimate aim of this fighting” (Jackson 2007, 398). Furthermore, during this period filled
with war, Muslims were safe nowhere, and continually were under attack. “The purpose of
jihad, in other words, is to provide for the security and freedom of the Muslims in a world
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that kept them under constant threat” (Jackson 2007, 401). By this argument, if Muslims
can exist peacefully with non-Muslims, then terrorist organizations have no right to call
themselves followers of Islam.
Moreover, Shaikh Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, a prominent Shia scholar and
reformer born in Najaf, Iraq, argues against armed violence because, in his opinion, it is
both ineffective and destructive to the Muslim community. “A close look at the results
shows beyond all doubt that armed violence is not a successful experiment for political
action, neither as a means for expressing political opinion and obtaining legitimate
presence in society nor for gaining political victory in a dispute” (Shams al-Din 2007, 444).
Shams al-Din states that terrorism is damaging to the Muslim community because it
resurrects the misconception that Islam is spread by the sword, and because it undermines
the use of dialogue between Muslims and other religious groups, and amongst Muslims
themselves. “Islam is free of these two accusations; it prohibits terror and deception even
in times of war and it represents the largest and broadest appeal for dialogue known to
human history” (Shams al-Din 2007, 445). Shams al-Din dismisses terrorism as a viable
option because violence is a futile means of achieving political gains, and because it is
outright forbidden in Islam.
Another justification for the differentiation between Islam and terrorism can be
found within the Quran itself. Khaled Abou el Fadl holds degrees from both Yale and
Princeton, and he emphasizes the difference between the words ‘jihad’ and ‘qital.’ Jihad
refers to striving and struggling to live a live pleasing to God, while qital refers to warfare
and fighting. “Every reference in the Quran to qital is restricted and limited by particular
conditions, but exhortations to jihad, like the references to justice or truth, are absolute and
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unconditional” (Abou el Fadl 2007, 463). The American media today has associated the
term ‘jihad’ with something it is not. Furthermore, Muslims were not allowed to engage in
qital until God gave them permission to, after they had been the victims of aggression.
Even in times of war, there are certain people that should never be targeted with violence.
“Relying on a precedent set by the Prophet, classical Muslim jurists held that noncombatants, like children, women, people of advanced age, monks, hermits, priests, or
anyone else who does not seek to or cannot fight Muslim, are inviolable and many not be
targeted even during ongoing hostilities” (Abou el Fadl 2007, 464). This statement alone
renounces any claim that terrorists might have to being Muslims, because a key strategy of
terrorism is targeting civilians. Abou el Fadl similarly rejects terrorism, saying that, in a
state of terrorism, “What prevails is an aggravated siege mentality that suspends the moral
principles of the religion in pursuit of political power” (Abou El Fadl 2007, 463).
Essentially, terrorism has never been about religion, but has always been about power.
Muslims also believe in the Day of Decision, or the Day of Reckoning, when each
will stand before God and be held accountable for his or her own actions. Each person is
responsible for his or her actions and deeds; as the Quran says, “the ultimate moral
responsibility and accountability of each believer” (Esposito 2016, 33). Every person will
stand before their Creator and answer for their actions, to see if they lived their lives in
accordance with the teachings of the Quran. As previously discussed, the Quran advocates
for the establishment of peaceful, just societies founded on equality and the caring for those
less fortunate. Conversely, “the Quran teaches that the act of destroying or spreading ruin
on earth is one of the gravest sins possible” (Abou el Fadl 2007, 460). Abou el Fadl
continues by saying “Those who corrupt the earth by destroying lives, property and nature

16

are designated as mufsidun, who, in effect, wage war against God by dismantling the very
fabric of existence” (Abou el Fadl 2007, 461). As such, one who claims to fight for the
promotion of Islam but does so by breaking the doctrines of Islam and by killing people
would not pass judgement and should no longer call themselves a Muslim.
Through all of these arguments, it is clear that for anyone to commit acts of terror,
they are not following Islamic doctrine and are not truly Muslim. These terrorist actors
abuse the name of Islam, which is a peaceful and just religion, to bring about political gains
of ruin and destruction. While religion might not be directly related to the effectiveness of
using military force to combat terrorism in the Middle East, it would be negligent to discuss
such a topic without making this clarification. Terrorists may try to hide under the guise of
Islam to commit their acts of violence, but the truth of the matter is that nothing terrorists
do can be defended by religion.

History of Basing:
The United States first began building permanent military bases overseas after
America won the Spanish-American War in 1898. At the war’s end, America gained
substantial land in the Far East and the Caribbean, and constructed bases with the purpose
of defending these newly acquired territories. Until World War II, the size of foreign bases
was limited by public opinion and the Washington Naval Conference’s Five Power Treaty
(Lostumbo 2013, 6). All this changed, however, after the Second World War and
specifically the attack on Pearl Harbor. This event “created an enduring sense of American
vulnerability that dispelled the past assumption that the United States would be safe if it
remained aloof from world affairs” (Lostumbo 2013, 6). In the 1940’s, the Joint Chiefs of
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Staff proposed a network of military bases around the world that would undeniably project
American prowess and be able to respond to any threat that arose anywhere in the world.
Since then, America’s military forces abroad have grown, from deterring Communism in
the Cold War, to combatting terrorism in the Middle East today. After Saddam Hussein’s
Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait in 1990, it opened the door for America to establish a
permanent military presence in the Middle East. While the Pentagon maintains that this
was never their goal, others question the legitimacy of that official statement (Baker 2004,
168).
Historians have dubbed the years in the 1960’s until the end of the Cold War the
‘garrison era,’ because during this time many of the military bases built during World War
II became permanent installations (Baker 2004, xi). When servicemen were stationed
abroad for extended periods of time, their families often moved with them. This led to the
creation of ‘Little Americas,’ the addition of housing, stores, shops, schools, hospitals,
chapels, gyms and golf courses, to give these families a taste of home (Baker 2004, 47).
These Little Americas made those living in them feel as if they were still within the borders
of the United States and gave them little reason to ever leave the base (Baker 2004, 53). As
such, the familiar installations improved morale among soldiers and their families and
mitigated controversial interactions between servicemembers and their host communities.
It also created an ease of mobility as soldiers and their families moved bases and countries
frequently. In each Little America throughout the world, families found familiar stores,
radio stations, and recreation facilities, creating a more comfortable lifestyle, and bringing
a piece of America to every corner of the world (Baker 2004, 58).
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Today, the United States has controversially assumed the role of ‘global
policeman,’ rebuilding war-torn countries and promoting democracy throughout the world
(Baker 2004, 173). As Figure 5 shows, there has been a steady level of active duty
American troops in Europe since 1953, until just after 1990, when presidents Bush and
Clinton began downsizing the American military force abroad. Troops stationed in East
Asia spiked dramatically during the Cold War and have been declining since then. The
Middle East, statistically speaking, has seen less American troops compared to Europe and
East Asia, with the exception of the years following September 11th. While critics complain
that America is sending too many troops to the Middle East, it should be noted that this
number is lower than the number of troops America had sent to Europe for decades, and
much lower than the number of American troops stationed in East Asia during the Cold
War.
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Active Duty U.S. Military Personnel Overseas, 1953 – 2010 (Figure 5)

Source: Lostumbo, Michael. RAND Report.

More recently, Figure 6 shows Marine Corps deployments between 1990 and 2013
based on location and type of deployment. The most frequent deployments were to the
Middle East, in the areas of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan. Figures 7 and 8
illustrate troop deployments specifically to the Arabian Peninsula. In the 23 years between
1990 and 2013, there were a total of 137 missions conducted by the U.S. Marine Corps. Of
those, 40 enforced a no-fly zone or were a show of force and deterrence. Humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief comprised 34 missions, 22 were assaults and raids, 20 were
embassy support and noncombatant evacuation operations, 13 were peace operations, and
8 were counterterrorism operations (Lostumbro 2013, 57). This diagram expertly illustrates
how Marine Corps operations are not solely focused on the Middle East, and, equally as
important, are not purely shows of violence or force. As journalist Robert Kaplan observed
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during his time with the American military in Iraq, “To the degree that anything got done
in these regions, it was done by the American military” (Kaplan 2006, 339). While the
Middle East has seen its share of assaults, raids, air strikes, and counterterrorism
operations, as Figure 6 shows, the Marine Corps has also conducted humanitarian aid
missions and peace operations in the area. The importance of these missions should not be
undervalued.

U.S. Marine Corps Deployments Since 1990 (Figure 6)

Source: Lostumbo, Michael. RAND Report.
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Graph of U.S. Forces on the Arabian Peninsula, 1980 – 2001 (Figure 7)

Source: Pape 2005, 53.

Chart of U.S. Forces on the Arabian Peninsula, 1980 – 2001 (Figure 8)

Source: Pape 2005, 53.
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Literature Review:
A Nation of Bases:
In this so-called War on Terror, the United States has implemented several military
measures, not the least of which were the invasion of Iraq and the ongoing war in
Afghanistan. However, many skeptics say that military options too often produce negative,
albeit unintended, consequences for those living in these war zones. Author David Vine is
one such person. In his book, Base Nation: How U.S. Military Bases Abroad Harm
America and the World, Vine argues that an increased American military presence is not
only ineffective, but that it is actually doing more harm than good (see Figure 9). “In Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia, foreign bases have created fertile breeding grounds for
radicalism and anti-Americanism; the presence of our bases in the Muslim Holy Lands of
Saudi Arabia was a major recruiting tool for al-Qaeda and part of Osama bin Laden’s
professed motivation for the September 11, 2011 attacks” (Vine 2015, 10). According to
Vine, American military presence abroad is creating more instances of terrorism, rather
than combatting it.
Vine is not alone in sharing this opinion. Some believe that the military has grown
into a beast all its own, uncontrollable by the government and out of touch with the best
interests of the American civilians it claims to protect. “Today, the military is an entirely
mercenary force, made up of volunteers paid salaries by the Pentagon. Although the
military still tries to invoke the public’s support for a force made up of fellow citizens, this
force is increasingly separated from civilian interests and devoted to military ones”
(Johnson 2000, 223). And while those in support of the military claim altruistic motives
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for the wars in the Middle East, whether they be to overthrow an unjust ruler or to rid the
world of ruthless terrorists, others believe this claim is a lie.
“American power in Afghanistan and elsewhere may have had universality
motives – the advancement of women’s rights, a liberal social order, and so
on – but the American military, by necessity, played a significant role in
that enterprise. And like all militaries, its ranks required a more aboriginal
level of altruism than that of the universalist society it sought to bring about”
(Kaplan 2006, 247).
This claim is not outdated, as many disgruntled Americans voice their misgivings of the
government and military through social media and various other platforms.

U.S. Military Bases Abroad (Figure 9)

Source: Vine, David. Base Nation.
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Vine also points out that America holds a double standard when it comes to building
bases abroad and not allowing any foreign military bases to be built within our borders.
“While there are no freestanding foreign bases on U.S. soil, today there are around eight
hundred U.S. bases in foreign countries, occupied by hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops”
(Vine 2015, 2-3) (See Figure 9). This number does not include outposts and checkpoints.
He continues, “Rarely does anyone ask whether we need hundreds of bases overseas, or
whether we can afford them. Rarely does anyone consider how we would feel with a
foreign base on U.S. soil, or how we would react if China, Russia, or Iran built even a
single base somewhere near our borders today” (Vine 2015, 3). Put in that perspective, it
would be easy to see how an enormous American base built within a foreign country’s
autonomous borders might feel like an invasion and an affront to state sovereignty (see
Figure 10).
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Major U.S. Military Instillations under CENTCOM (Figure 10)

Source: Lostumbo, Michael. RAND Report.
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In his book, Vine also describes how large American military bases are, making
them feel like a small U.S. city has been packed up and transported into another country.
The Department of Defense defines military bases as a “physical (geographic) location that
is or was owned by, leased to, or otherwise possessed by a DoD component” (DoD 2009,
4). This includes land, facilities, or both. With these ominous military bases come
thousands of military and civilian personnel, along with their families.
“In total, all the non-U.S. countries in the world combined have about thirty
foreign bases among them – as compared to the United States and its eight
hundred or so. If we add up all the troops and family members living with
them, plus the civilian base employees and their family members, the bases
are responsible for over half a million Americans abroad” (Vine 2015, 5).
European Union member states operate 16 facilities abroad that are considered major
military installations (Rogers 2009, 11). France maintains 9 military facilities abroad, and
the United Kingdom operates military facilities in 28 countries and territories overseas
(Rogers 2009, 11). Spain, Germany, and the Netherlands have also established military
facilities in foreign countries (Rogers 2009, 11). Figures 11 and 12 show the differences
in military installations operated by E.U. member states versus those operated by the U.S.
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Map of E.U. Member State Military Installations Abroad (Figure 11)

Source: EU:
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/sede300309studype407004_/SEDE300309StudyPE407004_en.pdf

Map of U.S. Military Installations Abroad (Figure 12)

Source: Politico: https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/06/us-military-bases-around-the-world-119321
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Additionally, while the U.S. has hundreds of military bases abroad with hundreds
of thousands of military and civilian personnel living in them, a disproportionate number
of those military bases are located in the Middle East (see Figure 13-15). “At the height of
the U.S. occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq, the total number of bases, combat outposts,
and checkpoints in those two countries alone topped one thousand” (Vine 2015, 3). The
U.S. has built bases in every country in the Persian Gulf except for Iran and has up to 17
bases in Turkey. One U.S. News report calculated that the United States is waging its war
on terror in 76 countries, or 40% of the planet (see Figure 14) (Besterman 2018). And while
there is a Base Closure and Realignment Commission established by Congress in 2005 that
seeks to aid in the closure of U.S. military bases, open source information regarding any
overseas base closures is few and far between (BRAC 2005). All of which poses the
question, are we getting favorable results from all of the time, money, and manpower we
are sending to the Middle East, or are we just wasting our resources? Are we achieving our
aims, or are we doing more harm than good?
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Operational Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Coverage (Figure 13)

Source: Lostumbo, Michael. RAND Report.

American Bases Abroad (Figure 14)

Source:
know

https://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2018-01-12/us-counterterrorism-forces-are-active-in-many-more-places-than-you-
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U.S. Deployments in the Middle East (Figure 15)

Source: https://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2002/us-deploy010214.gif

The Cost of Basing:
Another common objection to the U.S.’s plethora of military bases abroad is the
amount of U.S. tax payer dollars that are spent not only to build these bases, but also to
sustain them for an indefinite amount of time. “We’ve now invested more than $14 billion
to build housing, stationing, training and deployment capacities at major military
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installations,” says Senator Kay Hutchison. “Deployment of U.S. forces from Germany to
Iraq, for example, was complicated by denials of air and ground routes through several
European countries. We have proved we can best deploy from the United States — and we
can do it more cost effectively” (Hutchison 2010). Not only is building bases abroad using
money that could be better spent domestically, as some would argue, the United States is
aiding the economies of foreign nations, rather than tending to our own economic crisis
first. “It costs nearly 15 percent less to build in the United States than in Germany. In
addition, the U.S. military has invested $1.4 billion in German infrastructure from 2006 to
2010, while Germany’s contribution has averaged $20 million per year — or less than 10
percent” (Hutchison 2010). America would not only save money by building domestically,
we would aid in our own nation’s economic growth as well.
This dilemma is inherently connected to the idea of the Military Industrial
Complex, a term first coined by President Eisenhower in his farewell address in 1961.
Britannica defines the military industrial complex as a “network of individuals and
institutions involved in the production of weapons and military technologies,” and adds
that “the military-industrial complex in a country typically attempts to marshal political
support for continued or increased military spending by the national government”
(Britannica 2018). This notion highlights the interconnectedness between Congress, the
Department of Defense, and private military contractors. Taken to the extreme, it can
undermine democracy by placing too much emphasis on greed and financial gain. As the
saying goes, ‘Once weapons were manufactured to fight wars. Now wars are manufactured
to sell weapons.’ Figures 16-17 are a visual representation of the innerworkings of the
military industrial complex.
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Military Industrial Complex (Figure 16)

Source: https://www.bing.com/images/search?q=military+industrial+complex+&FORM=HDRSC2

Military Industrial Complex (Figure 17)

Source: https://www.bing.com/images/search?q=military+industrial+complex+&FORM=HDRSC2
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In addition to the financial burden incurred by building and sustaining military
bases, there remains the issue of nationalism and imperialism. A fierce sense of pride in
one’s nation, coupled with the idea that an imperialist force has unjustly deprived them of
their autonomy, can lead to a volatile situation. These factors together can lead to
radicalization and increased anti-American sentiments by those living in foreign countries.
Having such a large number of American servicemembers stationed abroad can also lead
to the intolerable, yet all too common, reports of military personnel taking advantage of
local women. This can lead to an increase in disease and prostitution in host communities.
Moreover, bases and Little Americas take up land that could have gone to the locals, while
simultaneously creating enormous environmental cost for the host nation (Baker 2004,
174).

Anti-Americanism:
It is no secret that many Americans and global citizens abroad fervently believe
that American military intervention increases incidents of anti-Americanism and
radicalization. Makdisi sums up the ideology by saying, “Anti-Americanism . . . did not
emerge organically in the region, and it does not flow naturally from medieval Islam. It
was produced recently, and it has been relentlessly stoked by political and historical
realities” (Makdisi 2010, 355). In other words, the cultural and religious tensions did not
begin overnight, nor will they end overnight. Indeed, the transpiration of many events
combined led to the palpable animosity present between America and the Arab nations
today.
“According to one study, the 71 al Qaeda operatives who committed suicide
terrorism between 1995 and 2003 were 10 times more likely to come from
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Muslim countries where a U.S. military presence for combat operations
existed than from other Muslim countries. Furthermore, when the U.S.
military presence occupies a country with a larger proportion of Islamist
radicals, al Qaeda suicide terrorists are 20 times more likely to come from
that country. Although this evidence does not irrefutably demonstrate that
the U.S. military presence in the Middle East is the leading source of
radicalization, it suggests a U.S. military presence is strongly correlated
with the recruitment and motivation of al Qaeda’s most radicalized
members” (Bowman 2008, 85).

Though this data is compelling, Bowman does not specify what is meant by a “larger
portion” of Islamist radicals in a country. There might be more U.S. military in a country
because there is more terrorism. This data does not conclusively prove that terrorism is
caused by the presence of the military. Bowman continues, “although U.S. Special Forces
and intelligence services may assist covertly, in nearly every conceivable scenario, existing
U.S. bases and conventional military forces offer little assistance and may actually
exacerbate conditions by fomenting radicalism and popular unrest against the U.S. military
presence and the host government that condones it” (Bowman 2008, 81). Many in the
Middle East were appalled and offended by the “liquor and miniskirts” that came with
American bases into their countries (Baker 2004, 72). Cultural differences, nationalism, a
fear of colonialism, and America’s alliance with Israel compound in many Arab nations,
producing fearful and hateful reactions to Americans in their countries (Baker 2004, 167).
Truly, many scholars pinpoint the inception of Arab anti-Americanism to the U.S.’s
public support for Israel and dismissal of Palestine (Makdisi 2010, 356). Proponents of this
method of thought argue that, by entering the Muslim Holy Lands, and the Middle East in
general, we, the United States, have brought this ‘war on terror’ upon ourselves. Some
critics even go so far as to say that these terrorists’ actions are justified, that they are
defending themselves against unjust imperialists. However, the preceding claims insight a
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mixed review. As Pape mentions in response to Bowman’s apparent correlation between
suicide terrorists and the presence of U.S. forces in their home countries, “we cannot say
with certainty that this detailed argument is the main impetus for individuals who
volunteered to carry out suicide missions,” since that would require interrogating the
terrorists after they’ve blown themselves up (Pape 2005, 104). It is also important to note
that just because one may be anti-American, it does not mean that they will become a
terrorist. Many Muslims could be classified as anti-American in that they do not support
America’s political actions in the Middle East, but will never themselves become violent
(Nydell 2006, 105). “It must be made clear that Middle Eastern Muslims and Arabs do not
‘hate’ America. Nor do they hate the American people. But they are very angry at
America’s government. It is only the extremist fringe that hates America” (Nydell 2006,
114). And anger is something we can work with, because if we put aside our fears and
differences in order to engage in constructive dialogue, we can understand the sources of
this anger and build bridges rather than burn them. In the following case studies, it is clear
that there is no correlation between an increase or decrease in American military
involvement and immediate changes in frequencies of terrorism. The opinion that
American military intervention sparks more instances of anti-Americanism is a popular
one but is without statistical backing.

Opposition to the War:
Another popular claim is that the U.S. is unnecessarily involved in wars in the
Middle East. Many scholars and civilians alike actively oppose the ‘war’ that the U.S. has
constantly been involved in since 9/11.
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“While the strategic decision to go to war may have been the most
appropriate and effective response conceivable in the immediate aftermath
of the events of 2001—as well as the only conceivable option politically
speaking—the last decade-plus of addressing the threat posed by Al Qaeda
has reminded us that even if the decision to go to war was inevitable and
non-negotiable, the U.S. decision to indeﬁnitely remain at war with Al
Qaeda is a choice” (McIntosh 2014, 24).
Said one Iraqi Sheikh to a Lieutenant Colonel stationed in Iraq, “We need visual examples
of progress. The more time that you Americans spend on your own security, the less effort
you put into rebuilding, and the less respect the average Iraqi has for you” (Kaplan 2006,
330). And while we have been in this war for more than 16 years now, terrorism has not
yet been eradicated. “The fact that the United States has had a military focused strategy for
nearly a decade and a half without successfully concluding the campaign suggests seriously
considering alternatives is warranted” (McIntosh 2014, 31). Approaching the issue from
this perspective leads some to believe that the U.S. is involved in a war that it cannot win.
War and the military are innately intertwined. To be at war, the military is almost
always involved. And when the military is involved, we are usually at war. This perception
has existed for generations, and for some, it is the only way they have ever known. “So
long as the United States remains at war, it will continue to use military force against Al
Qaeda if only because that is what it means to be ‘at war’ with an enemy” (McIntosh 2014,
24). But perhaps in this form of ‘war,’ the United States does not need such a strong
physical presence to be successful.
“Counterinsurgency is not necessarily the best approach to accomplish U.S.
national security interests in Afghanistan. America is unnecessarily biting
off more than it can chew with that approach; the U.S. military has the
means to conduct kinetic decapitation strikes against Al Qaeda, the Taliban,
and other terrorist leaders indeﬁnitely and without having a large force
presence on the ground” (Groves 2012, 38).

37

By this, Groves implies that targeting the leaders of these groups is the best method of
eliminating them, and that such operations can be done with few boots on the ground. He
uses the successful raid and killing of Osama bin Laden to back up his claim (Groves 2012,
38). We must remember, though, that the military does much more drop bombs and shoot
guns. As Figure 6 reminds us, the military provides disaster relief, supplies humanitarian
aid, and offers economic and educational assistance during times of crisis.

The Unconventional Enemy:
To many, projecting a strong military presence is a crucial tenet of America’s
history as a nation. However, this ‘war’ against al-Qaeda is not a traditional war because
Al-Qaeda is not a traditional enemy. “National leaders, for instance, have spoken of
‘victory’ in Afghanistan as if military victory is what they are after, when political
outcomes should always be paramount” (Groves 2012, 28). One of the differences between
traditional wars and this war on terror is that it must focus not just on weakening these
terrorist groups, but on completely eliminating them.
“Up to this point, a counterterror strategy of war may have been effective,
but as a tool for ending terrorist campaigns, military operations have
generally not been particularly useful. In this particular case, a strategy of
war has difﬁculties, but taking a step back to the level of counterterrorism,
history and research on the subject holds that while it may be successful in
lowering the threat from an organization, it rarely succeeds by itself in
ending the conﬂict” (McIntosh 2014, 30).
In short, using our military prowess to combat terrorism is an option that America has
always taken, but not one that has always been successful. And tradition alone is not a
sufficient reason to continue past practices without considering other options.
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While martial strategies might be effective in weakening terrorism, as of yet, they
have not been able to completely eradicate it. “War, as understood in the U.S. strategy
toward Al Qaeda, remains military focused, necessitates the use of force, and calls for the
defeat of the enemy in physical terms” (McIntosh 2014, 26). McIntosh continues, “so long
as victory is predicated on Al Qaeda’s complete destruction, ending the war will remain an
elusive goal because the U.S. conception of war in this case is at odds with the typical
process of de-escalation. Ending a war is rarely an outcome, but rather the product of a
deliberate decision made on the part of both parties” (McIntosh 2014, 28). The notion of
total annihilation with regard to terrorism is further complicated by the idea of democracy.
Democracy, the ideal that America so fervently cherishes and defends, necessarily requires
the protection of free speech, assembly, and expression. Because of this, truly democratic
societies cannot ever totally eliminate any and all possibilities of terrorism without fringing
upon the rights of their citizens.

Ulterior Motives:
Another argument against American military involvement is that the United States
enjoys being at war in the Middle East, because it allows us to have more military bases
and thus more control over the area. In order for the U.S. to be at war in the Middle East,
it necessarily requires the existence of terrorist groups. This leads some to question the
integrity of the U.S.’s presence in Middle Easters countries.
“Put differently, without the idea of Al Qaeda as a meaningful organization,
the individuals the United States targets would simply be individuals in
foreign countries the United States chose to kill rather than members of an
organization with which the United States is at war. Others have noted that
even the operational successes the United States has had abroad are
potentially offset in strategic terms because they provide perceptual support
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to the Al Qaeda claim that the United States is a violent, imperialist force
that unilaterally intervenes into foreign countries, providing a boon to
recruitment. Others have also identiﬁed the psychological effect
experiencing a loss from a drone strike can create for those individuals and
how that can encourage militancy” (McIntosh 2014, 29).
While the United States is not merely targeting innocent foreigners, it is targeting members
of an organized and sophisticated terrorist organization. Furthermore, it is true that civilian
casualties and collateral damage, as it is often called, feeds into the misinformation that the
U.S. is a malevolent entity. “In addition to the oft-cited concern regarding recruitment,
inevitable civilian casualties can dissuade individuals and/or groups from working with the
United States in terms of providing intelligence” (McIntosh 2014, 32). And in the long run,
remaining at war hurts not only America’s relationship with Muslims and Middle
Easterners, it could potentially hurt America’s foreign relations with our allies as well.
“Overlooked in this debate is that war itself, due to its inextricable
commitment to using force, does not have costs only in terms of civilian
death, the potential to alienate allies, and the physical and material costs of
war, but also in terms of opportunity costs. By remaining in a state of war
with Al Qaeda the United States effectively limits its ability to pursue
alternative strategies and tactics, and the longer the United States commits
to a strategy of war, the harder it will be to successfully implement an
alternative approach” (McIntosh 2014, 31).
Needless to say, military actions by the U.S. in the Middle East have had mixed reviews.
While some operations have had remarkable success, such as the raid on Osama bin
Laden’s compound, others have been viewed in a less favorable light, usually those
involving civilian casualties. The American military is an effective tool, but one that must
not be used lightly.
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A Case for Comparison - Germany:
While this paper focuses on U.S. military bases in the Middle East, it is worth
highlighting briefly the German response to U.S. military bases being built within German
boarders as a means of comparison. The U.S. has 174 bases in Germany (Vine 2015, 7),
and frequently uses bases in Germany to send aid, troops, and weapons to countries like
Afghanistan. As of 2010, “about 80 percent of the GIs, weapons, and supplies sent from
the United States to Iraq and Afghanistan are routed through Germany” (Rassbach 2010,
123). This country is valuable to the U.S. not only in transporting goods, but also in
transporting people. “According to a Department of Defense (DoD) report, at the end of
2008 there were 54,974 U.S. military personnel stationed in Germany, comprising more
than half of the 81,582 U.S. troops in Europe” (Rassbach 2010, 122). Of those 54,974 U.S.
military personnel in Germany in 2008, 13,300 deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan (Rassbach
2010, 123).
While the U.S. has closed some smaller bases in Germany, the DoD is now focusing
more on “enduring communities,” or “Main Operating Bases.” EUCOM defines ‘main
operating base’ as “an overseas, permanently manned, well protected base, used to support
permanently deployed forces, and with robust sea and/or air access” (Jones 2005). This is
in contrast with a Forward Operating Base, which contains less permanent equipment and
people. “The plan designates Germany as the long-term strategic and logistical foundation
of U.S. forces in Europe for wars in the Middle East, the territory of the former Soviet
Union, and Africa” (Rassbach 2010, 122). Six such bases are planned, one located in Italy,
and the remaining five all in Germany (Rassbach 2010, 122). These enduring communities
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show America’s intent to maintain a permanent military presence in Germany and as such,
make the country an interesting case for comparison with countries in the Middle East.
While many Germans and peace advocates such as Veterans for Peace (VFP) see
this as an over-step of the United States, it is not the whole story. “Peace activists argue
that the United States is now itself violating and undermining the international principles
it then sought to establish, especially the Nuremberg principle against wars of aggression”
(Rassbach 2010, 126). Members of the organization Veterans for Peace agree with this
conclusion. VFP is a non-profit international organization focused on exposing the true
costs of war, healing the wounds of war, and creating a world of peace. In January of 2018,
VFP joined scholars and activists from around the world at the University of Baltimore for
a conference with the intention of discussing U.S. foreign military bases, and how to close
them (VFP 2018).
However, it is worth noting that “while western Germans under occupation
developed strong movements against the U.S. military, now that Germany has achieved
full sovereignty and actually could challenge the United States, there is no such national
movement actively opposing the U.S. bases here” (Rassbach 2010, 126). This fact could
be attributed to a combination of several factors, but the most obvious factor is money.
American bases in Germany are supporting their economy significantly, and to challenge
the ‘Great American Superpower’ would do more damage to Germany than possible good.
Shown through the example of Germany, having American military bases in a host country
can be more beneficial to that host country than it is damaging.
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The Benefits of Basing:
While both Vine and Hutchison make cogent arguments about the negative and
costly effects of maintaining military bases overseas, there are also many convincing
arguments in favor of maintaining a robust military presence abroad. As Baker reminds us,
we all too often focus on the negatives instead of the positives. The American military
responds to natural disasters and emergencies such as earthquakes and floods and connects
people from all over the world through cultural and public events, as well as more
permanently, through marriage (Baker 2004, 174). One 2013 RAND Report discusses in
depth the benefits, costs and risks of maintaining America’s military presence overseas.
While the authors acknowledge the cost involved in maintaining the facilities and
personnel in bases around the world, they also highlight the benefits provided by having
an expansive global military force. Namely, the RAND report emphasizes an improved
operational response to contingencies, the ability to dissuade enemies and assure allies, and
the promotion of cooperation with partner militaries as advantages to having a strong
military presence abroad (Lostumbo 2013, xix).
“The presence of U.S. forces in a region shows a commitment and U.S. interest in
the security of the area, which speaks to the willingness of the United States to become
involved in future conflicts to stabilize situations, secure U.S. interests, and protect the
global commons” (Lostumbo 2013, xxi). While critics argue that keeping more troops at
home would save substantial fiscal resources, RAND argues that having American troops
abroad is beneficial in 2 major ways. Training with foreign partners provides cultural
awareness, teaching American troops about the culture, customs, and values of their host
nation, as well as benefiting the local militaries by teaching them alternative technical and
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training styles for combatting the common enemy (Lostumbo 2013, xxii). American
military bases overseas also benefit the economies of their host nations. This is especially
beneficial in developing nations, for example, those in North Africa. Military bases in
Morocco and Libya created jobs for locals in construction and agriculture, as well as other
goods and services (Baker 70, 2004).
The military of the United States is by definition tasked with a daunting task, to not
only respond to world events in a timely manner, but also to shape the world events of the
future. “The Pentagon envisions a force of highly trained, committed men and women who
can be deployed at a moment’s notice to bases within striking distance of an ‘arc of
instability’ encompassing North Africa, the Middle East, and Southern Asia” (Baker 2004,
167). RAND fervently believes that a strong forward military presence is instrumental is
achieving these aims. Military bases abroad set the foundation for building and
strengthening coalitions and alliances, maintain a readiness to act when disaster strikes,
and show those who threaten global security that the United States is willing and more than
able to counter such threats (Lostumbro 2013, 1).
This willingness and ability play a large part in deterring those who wish us harm,
because they demonstrate both the military might and political will to take action. “Foreign
bases and force presence contribute to both of these ingredients of deterrence. They
indicate a willingness of the United States to become involved in conflicts abroad, and they
shape perceptions about the effectiveness of the U.S. military to project power quickly and
sustain it over time” (Lostumbo 2013, 74). In the Middle East specifically, America and its
allies must focus on not only countering violent extremism, but also on deterring the
development of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. “To support these
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objectives, the United States will continue to place a premium on U.S. and allied military
presence in – and support of – partner nations in and around this region” (Lostumbro 2013,
18-19). Perception and deterrence are especially valuable tactics in the Middle East because
of the volatility of the region, with many countries facing internal conflicts as well as
external ones. As shown by Figures 18 and 19, nonstate actors target our military in a
variety of ways, through a variety of methods.
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Nonstate Actor Attacks on Military Targets 2000-2009 (Figure 18)

Source: Lostumbo, Michael. RAND Report.

Nonstate Actor Attacks on Military Facilities by Tactic (Figure 19)

Source: Lostumbo, Michael. RAND Report.
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Necessary but Insufficient:
There are staunch critics of U.S. military involvement to be sure, but not all scholars
believe that the U.S.’s involvement is wholly depraved. “To be fair, the sense of urgency
to prevent another successful attack has required concentrated focus—and America has
been largely successful in this regard. This is signiﬁcant and demonstrates the result of
excellent efforts within the intelligence, law enforcement, and military communities”
(Groves 2012, 27). Even scholars opposed to the idea of U.S. military intervention in the
Middle East can see the important value the military provides. “Moreover, U.S. ground
forces do have a constructive role to play in the region. The U.S. military can help train
allied military forces to secure their borders, reduce ‘ungoverned areas,’ and confront
insurgents or terrorist cells” (Bowman 2008, 83). The emerging dialogue indicates that,
while America’s current military presence in the Middle East is needed, it is simply not
enough. “What is clear is that the tactical efforts the United States has undertaken are
necessary but not sufﬁcient elements in achieving success” (Groves 2012, 28). We are
currently in a state of limbo; unable to pull out and presently unwilling to do more.
“America’s military pressure deﬁnitely disrupts the enemy’s ability to plan,
coordinate, and conduct successful attacks—especially spectacular attacks.
But they also contribute to further radicalizing elements of the Ummah
(global Muslim population), especially when civilian casualties result from
military strikes, though inadvertent on the American part, the perception is
substantially different among some Muslim segments. Global jihadists view
our strikes as a justiﬁcation for their struggle. They argue their case to illicit
fence sitters among the Ummah to join in solidarity with them and recognize
armed jihad as the only solution. And, without other efforts to build bridges
with Muslim communities domestically, the United States is in danger of
furthering a polarizing trend among average Americans that could lead us
in an opposite direction of our long-held ‘melting pot’ identity. Government
at all levels needs to address this issue to foster greater integration and
prevent fracturing along religious, ethnic, or socioeconomic lines” (Groves
2012, 32).
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Clearly, this is a multi-faceted problem, the solution to which will require a multifaceted approach. On the one side, American military intervention that causes collateral
damage can be a source of radicalization among Muslims. “Ironically, a robust U.S. ground
troop presence in the region undercuts this interest, serving as a major impetus for
radicalization. Yet, a large U.S. military presence is by no means the only source of
radicalization and terrorism directed against the United States” (Bowman 2008, 83). On
the other hand, the U.S. military has conducted several military operations that have
eliminated high-level terrorist leaders.
“The problem is that U.S. efforts are largely centered around tactical
pursuits versus strategic. America will not kill its way out of this threat.
Despite signiﬁcant pressure since 9/11 Al Qaeda has demonstrated
tremendous resiliency. U.S. and Coalition kinetic action has decimated 75
percent of the organization’s initial leadership. Yet, the group has absorbed
these losses and ‘transformed itself from a small hierarchical organization
into a global presence facilitated by twenty-ﬁrst-century communications
that made its reach seem ubiquitous and its radicalization of young Muslims
seem unstoppable’” (Groves 2012, 33).
The question of eliminating the threat posed by the mere existence of terrorist groups is a
complex one that requires that everyone keep an open mind and focus on the importance
of civil dialogue. It is a complex issue that can trace its roots back a century, and must be
handled in the correct way, so as to not create more problems for future generations.

The Lion of Saudi Arabia:
It is impossible to discuss terrorism, the Middle East, and America’s involvement
there without also discussing the deadliest terrorist attack on American soil: September
11th, 2001. In 102 infamous minutes, nearly 3,000 Americans lost their lives on that tragic
day, bringing Middle Eastern terrorism to the forefront of the world’s mind. This research
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would be incomplete without addressing the mastermind behind the whole operation,
Osama bin Laden. Rumors and speculation saturate discussion of this notorious man,
including allegations that America’s presence in the Middle East, specifically Saudi
Arabia, lit the spark of radicalization in bin Laden’s life that eventually led to the
catastrophic events of September 11th. Some use this line of thought to go so far as to say
that America brought September 11th upon herself. “A look at the rise of al Qaeda as a
threat to the United States in the 1990s illustrates the radicalizing effect that often
accompanies a U.S. military presence. The U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia
represents the primary reason Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda began to target the United
States in the 1990s” (Bowman 2008, 84). In his 1996 fatwa, bin Laden himself cites
America’s continued presence in Saudi Arabia, the land of the two Holy Places, as a reason
for his declaration of war against the United States.
This event was justifiably a turning point in U.S. – Arab relations and caused many
to question how this could have happened, and what could have been done to prevent such
a massive loss of life. “Not only did bin Laden consistently cite the U.S. presence in Saudi
Arabia as the paramount justification for jihad in the years leading up to the September 11
attacks, but 15 of 19 hijackers were from Saudi Arabia, two from the UAE, one from Egypt,
and one from Lebanon” (Bowman 2008, 84). The U.S. has 5 bases in Saudi Arabia, 3 bases
in the UAE, and 2 bases in Egypt. Bowman continues, “In a poll of Saudis taken after the
September 11 attacks, 95 percent of Saudis agreed with bin Laden’s objection to U.S.
forces in the region” (Bowman 2008, 84). Many scholars and civilians alike blame poor
U.S. military planning and bureaucratic missteps as the cause of the radicalization of
Osama bin Laden, and with it, the rise of Al-Qaeda.
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However, few stop to investigate the man behind the name that fills so many with
rage, grief, and loathing. Osama (meaning ‘young lion’ in Arabic) bin Laden was born on
March 10, 1957 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Osama was the 17th son to his father, who had
roughly 50 children between several different wives. His mother was a Syrian, who is
reportedly no longer considered part of the bin Laden family (Bergen 2001, 44). Osama’s
father, Mohammed bin Awad bin Laden, emigrated from Yemen to Saudi Arabia when he
was a young man. Mohammed built a very successful construction company, and
eventually became known as the “King’s private contractors” (Bergen 2001, 44). In 1967,
when Osama was 10 years old, his father died in a plane crash, leaving his estate and
prosperous company to his children. Osama’s eldest brother would meet the same fate as
their father 21 years later, dying in a plane he was flying over San Antonio, Texas. By the
mid-1990’s, the estimated worth of the Saudi Binladen Group (SBG) was near $5 billion
(Bergen 2001, 46). The group had taken contracts with projects ranging from airports in
Egypt and Yemen, to seaside resorts in Syria, to mosques and office sky scrapers in Saudi
Arabia. Ironically, SBG also undertook a $150 million project to construct a military base
for more than 4,000 American soldiers in Saudi Arabia, which would later be used by the
American military in executing strikes against bin Laden’s hideouts (Bergen 2001, 47).
When he was 17, Osama married the first of his four wives, a Syrian girl who was
a distant relative. Afterwards, he attended King Abdul-Aziz University, where he received
degrees in economics and public administration in 1981 (Bergen 2001, 47). It was during
this time that bin Laden became acquainted with the Muslim Brotherhood and their leaders,
specifically Abdullah Azzam and Muhammad Qutb. Bin Laden’s sister would go on to
marry the head of the Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. When the Soviets
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invaded Afghanistan on Christmas Eve 1979, the seed of radicalization had already been
planted and began to sprout in Osama’s mind. “Unprovoked, a superpower invaded a
largely peasant nation and inflicted on it a total, totalitarian war. The population rose up
under the banner of Islam to drive the infidels out” (Bergen 2001, 49). At 22 years of age,
bin Laden went immediately to Afghanistan and joined the mujahideen to fight against the
Soviets. The millionaire gave up his comfortable and lavish lifestyle to fight in a war and
donated substantial portions of his own money to the cause. The war in Afghanistan served
as a quasi-networking event for up-and-coming terrorist leaders, and bin Laden met many
men like himself who shared similar ideologies. In 1989, encouraged by the Soviet
withdrawal from Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden founded his Strong Base: Al-Qaeda
(Bergen 2001, 59).
While skeptics of American military prowess claim that the CIA created the
mujahideen and thus also created bin Laden himself, this is simply not the case. It is true
that America was seeking payback for the Soviet’s backing of the North Vietnamese, and
thus backing the Afghans who were fighting the Soviets indeed sweetened the pot.
However, “American officials did not venture into Afghanistan during the war against the
Soviets for fear of handing the Communists a propaganda victory if they were captured”
(Bergen 2001, 64). Bin Laden was already expressing anti-American sentiments and
because of his family’s lucrative construction business, he had little need for CIA money.
The CIA, seeking plausible deniability, funneled its money in support of the Afghans
through the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence Agency (ISI). Part of the ISI’s deal with
America was that no American have any contact with the mujahedeen, nor the dispersal of
weapons or funds. With this hands-off approach, however, the Pakistanis were able to use
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their own discretion when determining which rebel groups received American funds.
Naturally, they opted to back the most pro-Pakistani groups, who also happened to be the
most anti-American. Here, the CIA could have pressured the Pakistanis to give the
American funds to groups who were more pro-American, but the issue was never pressed.
Over the course of the war, American investments ranged from $20 million a year to $630
million a year, accumulating to a total of $3 billion when all was said and done (Bergen
2001, 68). While the CIA might have erred in not forcing the Pakistanis to support only
pro-American resistance groups in Afghanistan, the United States is certainly not liable for
the atrocities bin Laden and others subsequently spread throughout the world.
Clearly, America’s involvement in the radicalization of Osama bin Laden is, and
will continue to be, a hotly debated topic. Many believe that America’s over-zealous
militaristic nature and greedy ulterior motives led an otherwise educated, non-violent man
to snap, and that because of this, we are responsible for the lives lost on September 11th.
Some believe that bin Laden “only turned against the United States in 1991 because he
regarded the stationing of American troops in his native Saudi Arabia during and after the
Persian Gulf War as a violation of his religious beliefs. Thus, the attacks . . . are an instance
of blowback rather than unprovoked terrorism” (Johnson 2000, 11). But in reality, the truth
is rarely ever so black and white. “For al-Qaeda, religion matters, but mainly in the context
of national resistance to foreign occupation. The fact that the United States and its allies
are predominantly non-Islamic societies makes it easier for al-Qaeda’s leaders to exploit
their own religion to justify the use of martyrdom operations as the main weapon for
national liberation” (Pape 2005, 104). The fact that Eastern and Western cultures differ so
vastly makes it easier to catalyze both fear of the unknown and contempt for the ‘other.’
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“Bin Laden is at war with the United States, but his is a political war, justified by his own
understanding of Islam, directed at the symbols and institutions of American political
power” (Bergen 2001, 222). Even if bin Laden’s motives had been truly religious and not
politically motivated, nothing justifies terrorism. And purposely targeting non-combatants
is exactly that: terrorism. In the end, nothing can ever justify the taking 3,000 innocent
lives. Nothing.

Case Studies:
Afghanistan:
One of the most critical countries in this debate is Afghanistan. Afghanistan has a
population of over 34 million, comprised of Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, other ethnic
groups. “From the days of King Ahmad Shah, Afghanistan constituted a fragile web-work
of tribes and ethnic groups occupying the water-starved wastes between the settled areas
of the Russian Empire in Central Asia, the Persian Empire in the Middle East, and the
British Empire in the Indian subcontinent” (Kaplan 2006, 194). Its population is 99.7%
Muslim; approximately 90% of which is Sunni Muslim, and 10% is Shia (CIA World
Factbook). In terms of social and economic development, only 38% of their population is
literate, there is on average less than one doctor per 1,000 people, and the current life
expectancy is 51 years. When the Soviets invaded in December of 1979, 1.3 million
Afghans lost their lives and another 5 million, a third of the country’s population, were
forced into exile (Bergen 2001, 49).
The United States entered Afghanistan in October 2001, one month after the attacks
of September 11th, and currently has 9 military bases within the country (Vine 2015). One
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such base is Bagram Air Force Base, which serves as the headquarters for Combined Joint
Task Force 180, an alliance between America and 33 other countries (Kaplan 2006, 196).
Included on the base is a 250-bed American hospital, constructed in just 72 hours, and
known for being the finest medical care in the Middle East and Central Asia. Though its
intended use was to treat wounded soldiers, most of the medical staff devote their time to
treating locals who become injured from the countless mines left by the Soviets when they
invaded the country, or who become ill due to the extended drought in the country (Kaplan
2006, 197). Since 2001, 2,247 military servicemen and women have lost their lives in
Afghanistan and 20,000 U.S. service members have been wounded (Department of State).
While there are approximately 8,400 U.S. troops remaining in Afghanistan this year, “U.S.
force levels peaked at roughly 100,000 in 2011 and began to decrease through 2014” (State
Department), though America is still deploying troops to Afghanistan today.
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Map of Afghanistan (Figure 20)

Source: http://i.cnn.net/cnn/SPECIALS/2001/trade.center/maps/map.opposition.advance.gif

Most of the terrorist incidents that take place in Afghanistan are the workings of
the Taliban or local chapters of ISIS. Using the Global Terrorism Database, one can
compare the frequency of terrorist attacks with the above information regarding U.S. troop
levels in the country. In 2001, when the U.S. entered Afghanistan, there were around 100
terrorist attacks reported in Afghanistan (See Figure 21). As the graph in Figure 21
illustrates, 2010 saw approximately 500 terrorist attacks within Afghanistan, but in 2011,
when the most U.S. troops were present in the country, the number of terrorist attacks
declined for the first time in 6 years. In 2011, there were just over 400 terrorist attacks in
the country. After that, the number rose steeply to around 1,500 attacks in 2012, and peaked
at almost 2,000 terrorist attacks within the year 2015. During the years 2011 to present,
U.S. troops have been withdrawing from Afghanistan, as the State Department cited (See
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Figure 22). However, the years when U.S. troops left the country, the number of terrorist
attacks increased dramatically. Based on this evidence, it is clear that the presence of U.S.
troops in Afghanistan is not causing an immediate increase in terrorist attacks.

Number of Attacks

Terrorist Attacks in Afghanistan (Figure 21)

Year
Source: Global Terrorism Database.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?page=1&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=2000&end_yearonl
y=2016&dtp2=all&country=4&charttype=line&chart=overtime&ob=GTDID&od=desc&expanded=yes#results-table
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U.S. Armed Forces and Contractor Personnel in Afghanistan: Q4 FY2007 – Q1
FY2017 (Figure 22)

Source: Congressional Research Service. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44116.pdf

Iraq:
To say that America’s invasion of Iraq in 2003 is contentious would be an
understatement. Many debate the true motives for the United States entering the country,
whether it be to combat terror, to seek oil, or a myriad of other options in between. The
CIA states that “continued Iraqi noncompliance with UNSC resolutions over a period of
12 years led to the US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 and the ouster of the Saddam
Husayn regime” (CIA Factbook). While the reasons or legitimacy for invading the country
can be debated indefinitely, the violence that has occurred within the country is undeniable.
According to Vine, there are 6 U.S. military bases in Iraq as of 2015 (Vine 2015, 328).
While the United States entered Iraq in March 2003, which is also when the vast majority
of the bases were built, the number of U.S. troops peaked in 2007, and has decreased since
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then (See Figure 24). Incidents of terrorism, on the other hand, have risen since 2002, and
peaked sharply in 2014 (See Figure 25).

Map of Iraq (Figure 23)

Source: http://origins.osu.edu/sites/origins.osu.edu/files/2-4-map337_0.jpg
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Number of Attacks

Terrorist Attacks in Iraq (Figure 24)

Year
Source: GTD.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=2000&end_yearonly=2016&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=
&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&country=95&asmSelect1=&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=

U.S. Armed Forces and Contractor Personnel in Iraq: Q4 FY2007 – Q1 FY2014; Q1
FY2015 – Q1 FY2017 (Figure 25)

Source: Congressional Research Service. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44116.pdf
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As can clearly be seen, there is no correlation between American military presence
in Iraq, and either an immediate increase or decrease of instances of terrorism within the
country. In 2014, the year with the most violence in Iraq, the U.S. military was withdrawing
its forces. And in 2007, the year with the highest number of U.S. troops present in the
country, there were significantly less instances of violence compared to the following
years, when the U.S. began to withdraw its support (See Figures 25-26). Which poses the
question, if the American military is neither decreasing the frequency of acts of terrorism,
nor causing an increase thereof, what could explain these trends? Richard Medina complied
a geographic information systems analysis of the violence in Iraq from 2004 until 2009 and
presents several compelling arguments.

Total Number and Average Number of Terrorist Attacks in Iraq per Six Months
(Figure 26)

Source: Medina, Richard, et al.
http://content.ebscohost.com/ContentServer.asp?T=P&P=AN&K=66825498&S=R&D=a9h&EbscoContent=dGJyMNLr40SeqLI4zdn
yOLCmr0%2Bep7FSr6a4Ta6WxWXS&ContentCustomer=dGJyMPGvrkixrbBQuePfgeyx43zx
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According to Medina’s research,
“The last half of 2009 shows a slight increase in attacks and another rise in
the number of districts with more attacks. This is likely due to the onset of
the U.S. withdraw and plans to return a sovereign Iraq. For purposes of
draining U.S. resources, terrorists may work to maintain conﬂict in Iraq and
other places throughout the world, as well as start new conﬂict in other
regions” (Medina 2011, 872).
In other words, terrorists might create more instances of violence in order to drain the
resources and weaken the resolve of those military and local forces fighting them. This
transfer of power also raises the issue of the power vacuum created by the withdrawal of
U.S. troops from the area, which terrorist groups could use as an opportunity to take more
power.
Medina also realizes the possibility of other explanations for the increase or
decrease of terrorist activities.
“The decline in number of attacks and area of affected districts after 2007
may be a result of the Baghdad wall construction in Ad Hamiyah in April
2007. The Ad Hamiyah wall separates Sunni and Shi’a communities. A
similar wall was built in Ghazaliya, Baghdad, also in 2007, much of which
was constructed with temporary barriers. Following the wall construction
there was a large decrease in terrorist attacks” (Medina 2011, 873).
It is essential to note when debating the effectiveness of military means to achieve peace
that terrorism and peace are linked to much more than just military advances or
withdrawals. Terrorism can also be sparked by sectarian differences. This is especially true
in Iraq, which is home to significant populations of both Shia and Sunni Muslims. The
political arena also seems to have an impact on terrorism in the country.
“Beginning in 2004, there are small spikes in attacks, but the largest spike
occurs in the ﬁrst half of 2005 with the Iraqi elections. Following the
elections, there is a small dip in attacks, but a rise follows around the time
of constitution activity. It seems that these political actions are responsible
for triggering at least some of the terrorist activity. Following the
constitution approval the attacks increased to their largest spike in mid-
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2006, which may have been driven by the death of Abu Mussabal-Zarqawi.
His death on 7 June 2006 may have been a trigger for heightened terrorist
activity in Iraq, but the lack of his leadership following his death, and the
spike of activity, may have led to decreased overall activities until the end
of 2006 where an increase is again recorded” (Medina 2011, 874-875).

In short, Medina’s research proves the point that terrorism, and the absence thereof, are
affected by a myriad of factors, including but not limited to, military actions. Terrorism is
a multi-faceted problem, affected by many factors, that requires a multi-faceted solution.

Number (black) and Intensity (gray) of Attacks

Average Intensity (gray) and Attacks per Day (black) in Relation to Major
Events in Iraq (Figure 27)

Time
Source: Medina, Richard.
http://content.ebscohost.com/ContentServer.asp?T=P&P=AN&K=66825498&S=R&D=a9h&EbscoContent=dGJyMNLr40
SeqLI4zdnyOLCmr0%2Bep7FSr6a4Ta6WxWXS&ContentCustomer=dGJyMPGvrkixrbBQuePfgeyx43zx

62

In mid-2007, terrorist incidents began to decrease slightly. This could be due to an
increase of troops in the area, or the recent construction of the Baghdad wall, or a
combination of both (See Figure 27). But in 2009, the monthly average of instances of
terror again began to increase. As Medina notes, “This increase in activity coincides with
the shift of power from coalition forces to Iraqi forces, including the Green Zone transfer,
the end of operations for the United Kingdom, and the initiation of the U.S. withdrawal”
(Medina 2011, 875). From this viewpoint, the withdrawal of U.S. troops in Iraq led to an
increase in terrorism. The goal of this violence, Medina states, is two-fold. Increased
instances of terror lower the morale of those living in the area, and also bait the coalition
forces into staying longer, in order to further exhaust their resources. “Upon withdrawal of
coalition troops from Iraq, some Islamists theorize the takeover of disorganized and
essentially leaderless regions” (Medina 2011, 875). While some terrorist activities might
be tied to political events or important religious holidays or anniversaries, in the case of
Iraq, many times terrorism increases when the coalition forces begin to leave. For a
multitude of possible reasons, the counterterrorism work of the U.S. military seems to have
made a positive impact on the region on more than one occasion.

Saudi Arabia:
Located on the Arabian Peninsula, Saudi Arabia contains about 16% of the world’s
oil, and is also known as the birthplace of Islam, containing both Mecca and Medina within
its borders (CIA Factbook). Questions about the U.S.’s continued partnership with Saudi
Arabia abound due to the country’s ample access to oil, as well as their questionable views
on human and women’s rights. All of this aside, the U.S. has used its bases in Saudi Arabia
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as a crucial springboard to reach other nations in the Middle East. America first entered the
country in 1990, upon the request of Saudi Arabia, when Iraq invaded Kuwait (See Figure
29) (CIA World Factbook). U.S. forces remained in the country until 2003, when the
American presence within the country caused tension between the public and the Royal
Family (CIA World Factbook). Since the Gulf War in 1991, close to 5,000 American
airmen and soldiers have been stationed in the desert nation, despite allegations that such
a military presence inspires radicalism and extremism (Baker ix, 2004). Today, America
has 5 military bases in Saudi Arabia: Riyadh Air Base, King Khalid Air Base, King
Abdulaziz Naval Base, Eskan Village Air Base, and King Fahd Military Medical Complex
(Vine 2015, 328).

Map of Saudi Arabia (Figure 28)

Source: https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/gulf/images/saudi-airbase.gif
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Number of Attacks

Terrorist Attacks in Saudi Arabia (Figure 29)

Year
Source: GTD.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=&end_yearonly=&start_year=&start_month=&start_day
=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&country=173&asmSelect1=&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_t
ype=b&casualties_max=

Bradley Bowman of the Washington Quarterly states,
“The 2006 U.S. ‘National Strategy for Combating Terrorism’ largely
neglects the role of the U.S. military presence in al Qaeda’s emergence or
in the continuing radicalization that fuels terrorism, pointing instead to
social, political, and ideological maladies endemic to the Arab world, as
well as past U.S. support for authoritarian regimes” (Bowman 2008, 85).
The article continues, “For purposes of developing the future U.S. strategy and force
posture in the region, one only needs to establish that the U.S. military presence was and
continues to be one of a handful of major catalysts for anti-Americanism and
radicalization” (Bowman 2008, 85). While Bowman and many others argue that the U.S.
presence in Saudi Arabia led to the radicalization of Osama bin Laden, and continues to
lead to anti-American extremist today, there is no empirical evidence to support the claim
that the presence of U.S. troops in the country correlates to an immediate uptick in instances
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of terror attacks. When the U.S. entered in 1990, up until the U.S. left in 2003, the
frequency of terror attacks within Saudi Arabia remained steadily low. When the U.S.
pulled out of the country in 2003, terrorist activities spiked in 2004. It was not until 2014
when Saudi Arabia saw the sharpest rise of terrorism in its history. The GTD attributes
most of these attacks to Houthi extremists, a minority group from Northern Yemen, who
practice a variation of Shia Islam (Mazzetti 2015). In 2015, Saudi Arabia began fighting
the Houthis in Yemen, which might explain the increase of terrorist attacks by the Houthis
in Saudi Arabia. But, as Bowman states, whether it be the violence in Saudi Arabia or in
America, “Admittedly, there is rarely a single explanation for any phenomenon, and it
would be extremely difficult to definitively and quantifiably rank the causes for al Qaeda’s
emergence and its attacks on the United States” (Bowman 2008, 85). It would be difficult
indeed to link a rise or fall in terrorist activities to one single factor.

Bahrain:
Bahrain is a small island nation off the coast of Saudi Arabia that gained its
independence from Great Britain in 1971 (CIA World Factbook). While the government is
Sunni, the majority of the population is Shia, due in part to the fact that over 50% of
Bahrain’s total population is immigrants (CIA World Factbook). Bahrain was the first
country to begin producing oil, which currently accounts for approximately 60% of the
nation’s economy (Nydell 2006, 183). As of 2015, the United States has 10 military bases
within the country and considers it a vital asset in its relations with the rest of the Middle
East (Vine 2015, 328). After the First Gulf War, Bahrain became the headquarters of the
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5th Fleet, constituting 1,000 personnel on land and approximately 12,000 patrolling the
Gulf on Naval vessels (Baker 2004, 169). According to the Department of State,
“Bahrain plays a key role in regional security architecture and is a
vital U.S. partner in defense initiatives. Bahrain hosts the U.S.
Navy's Fifth Fleet and participates in U.S.-led military coalitions.
Bahraini forces have supported the International Security Assistance
Force in Afghanistan, providing perimeter security at a military
base. Bahrain was the first Arab state to lead a Coalition Task Force
patrolling the Gulf and has supported the coalition counter-piracy
mission with a deployment of its flagship. The U.S. designated
Bahrain a Major Non-NATO Ally in 2002” (Department of State
2017).
Bahrain provides an interesting point of view into this debate in that it is relatively
uncontroversial, compared to many of the other countries in the Middle East where
America has a military presence.

Map of Bahrain (Figure 30)

Source: https://fanack.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2014/10/bahraini-defence-force_bahrain_map_navy-bases_318px_02.jpg
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Number of Attacks

Terrorist Attacks in Bahrain (Figure 31)

Year
Source: GTD.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?expanded=no&search=bahrain&ob=GTDID&od=desc&page
=1&count=100

When the U.S. entered Bahrain after the country gained its independence in 1971,
there was no increase in terrorist attacks within the country (See Figure 31). The spikes of
terrorist attacks in 1996 and 2013 could be related to the Arab Spring, continued unrest
within the country itself between the Sunni and Shia sects, or a combination of both factors.
According to the GTD, many of the attacks were perpetrated by unknown actors, but of
those actors who are known, most of the attacks were committed by ISIS. Moreover,
Bowman admits in his article for the Washington Quarterly that, “Despite the U.S. naval
base’s central location in Manama, little evidence exists to suggest the U.S. naval base is
promoting radicalization. This absence of a radicalizing effect may be partially explained
by the tremendous economic boost the navy base provides to the energy-deficient island
nation” (Bowman 2008, 86). As noted, U.S. military bases can in fact provide economic
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support to the countries in which they are located, benefiting not only the United States,
but also the host country and its inhabitants.

Turkey:
Another interesting case study is Turkey. After the fall of the Ottoman Empire
following World War I, Turkey gained its independence in 1923. The country has seen its
share of coups and uprisings, many of which attempted to restore democratic power to the
people. After the Cold War, many Turks criticized the American presence in the country,
saying that America should remember that they were guests in a foreign nation. Some even
complained that America was conducting clandestine operations within Turkey’s borders
that they should not have been conducting even within an enemy’s borders (Baker 2004,
75). During this same time period, there were reports of Turks spitting and slapping
Americans and their families, throwing stones, scratching cars, and slashing tires (Baker
2004, 75). “A separatist insurgency begun in 1984 by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK),
a US-designated terrorist organization, has long dominated the attention of Turkish security
forces and claimed more than 40,000 lives” (CIA Factbook). While negotiations and peace
talks have occurred, the situation between the two groups still remains tense. In 2015 and
2016, “Turkey witnessed an uptick in terrorist violence, including major attacks in Ankara,
Istanbul, and throughout the predominantly Kurdish southeastern region of Turkey” due to
tensions between the PKK and the Turkish forces (CIA Factbook). In 2016, 265 people
were reported killed and more than 1,400 injured during a failed coup attempt. In
retaliation, President Erdogan arrested almost 3,000 Turkish military officers and judges
in a government crackdown(USA Today 2016).
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Today, Turkey has a population of over 80 million, making it the 18th most
populated country in the world (CIA Factbook). Turkey’s population is 70-75% Turkish,
19% is Kurdish, and the remainder are other minorities. Sunni Muslims make up 99.8% of
the population, with the other 0.2% being Christians and Jews (CIA Factbook). The literacy
rate is 95.6%, there are just under 2 doctors per 1,000 people, and the life expectancy is 75
years on average (CIA Factbook). Turkey has more than 1.1 million Internally Displaced
Persons, mainly Kurds displaced due to the violence between the Kurdish PKK and the
Turkish military. The country also currently has 30,000 refugees from Iraq, 7,000 refugees
from Iran, and more than 3.1 million refugees from Syria (CIA Factbook).
Incirlik Air Force Base is one of the most important U.S. military bases in Turkey
and in the Middle East, as it provides support to many of the surrounding countries. It
played a pivotal role in America’s Operation Provide Comfort, in which the United States
sought to protect Iraqi Kurds from Saddam Hussein’s oppressive regime after the Gulf War
(Johnson 2000, 15). The U.S. began building this base in 1951, approximately 250 miles
southeast of Ankara (Incirlik Air Base History) (See Figure 32). In 1954, the U.S. signed a
contract with Turkey, agreeing to share the facility. Originally named Adana, the base
proved to be an invaluable asset in the war against the Soviets. Renamed Incirlik in 1958,
the base proved its value yet again during the Lebanon crisis of that same year. In 1975, in
response to an embargo imposed by the U.S., Turkey mandated that all U.S. bases in
Turkey would close and transfer all power to the Turkish military. Only Incirlik and Izmir
remained open, due to their NATO missions (Incirlik Air Base History). Normal U.S.
missions resumed after 1980, and America began improving and expanding the base. In
the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Incirlik aided or hosted task forces Proven Force,
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Operation Desert Storm, Operation Provide Comfort (I, II, and III), and eventually
Operation Northern Watch (Incirlik Air Base History).

Map of Turkey (Figure 32)

Source:
https://www.bing.com/images/search?view=detailV2&ccid=axaGDH1h&id=9BB47ABB1C169C276BF8BC88097C2D0149FB918A
&thid=OIP.axaGDH1h__Z8oqtq9VlxSgEsC_&q=incirlik+air+force+base+on+a+map+&simid=608025512383811560&selectedIndex
=1&ajaxhist=0

Turkey’s Incirlik Air Base has played a pivotal role in American responses across
the Middle East. “Incirlik has always served as a hub for U.S. support to the Turkish
government in the wake of disasters and humanitarian emergencies” (Incirlik Air Base
History). For example, the U.S sent aid via Incirlik after the Van earthquake in 1976 and
the consecutive earthquakes in Istanbul in 1999. After 9/11, the base served as the main
hub for humanitarian aid to Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom. “The aerial
port managed a 600 percent increase in airflow during the early stages of OEF” (Incirlik
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Air Base History). With the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, Operation
Northern Watch officially ended. The final flight “terminated a successful 12-year mission
to contain Iraq militarily” (Incirlik Air Base History). In 2004,
“More than 300 soldiers of what would become thousands transited through
Incirlik as the first stop back to their home post in the U.S. after spending
almost a year in Iraq. Incirlik was part of what was then described as the
largest troop movement in U.S. history. Incirlik provided soldiers with a
cot, warm location, entertainment and food for their first few hours outside
of a hostile war zone” (Incirlik Air Base History).
The base was able to serve not only those affected by natural disasters, but it was also able
to provide some measure of comfort to the servicemen and women serving abroad.
In 2005, Incirlik provided support for the Pakistan Earthquake Relief Effort,
supported by 7 different countries. “Over 100 trucks offloaded supplies at Incirlik that were
transported in over 130 airlift missions which delivered 1,647 tons of supplies including
heating oil, food and blankets” (Incirlik Air Base History). In 2006, Incirlik served as a
safe haven for displaced Americans fleeing the violence in the Israeli-Lebanon conflict.
“Incirlik Airmen readied Patriot Village, which provided housing, telephone access, a 24hour BX/Shopette, a children's play area, chaplain's assistance and medical services for
people transitioning back to the U.S” (Incirlik Air Base History). And as of 2008, Incirlik
alone moved up to 18% of Air Military Command’s cargo and provided up to 57% of
sustainment cargo for Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom (Incirlik Air Base
History). All this to say that U.S. military bases do much more than just facilitate air strikes
and serve as logistical hubs for military supplies and equipment. They also enable the U.S.
to send aid quickly and effectively to any part of the world at a moment’s notice.
When comparing this data with reports of terrorism according to the Global
Terrorism Database, one can see that Turkey has experienced many different periods of
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violence at the hands of several different terrorist groups. In the 5 years when the U.S.
pulled out of its bases in Turley between 1975 to 1980, the country experienced years with
almost no terrorist attacks in 1975, almost 200 attacks in 1977, about 50 attacks in 1978,
and back up to 150 attacks in 1979 (see Figure 33) (Global Terrorism Database). After
September 11th, when the base experienced a 600% increase in airflow, the country saw 50
or less terrorist attacks each year from 2001 until 2010 (GTD). This includes 2004, when
Incirlik was part of the largest U.S. troop movement in history. Obviously, Turkey has
suffered greatly due to the violence perpetrated by terrorists. But none of the evidence
supports any type of correlation between frequency of terror attacks and U.S. military
presence.

Number of Attacks

Terrorist Attacks in Turkey (Figure 33)

Year
Source: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?search=turkey+&sa.x=32&sa.y=9
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Military Opinion:
As aforementioned, researching this topic without incorporating the views and
opinions of our military servicemembers who are actually sent into these countries where
terrorism is so prevalent would be incomplete and negligent. Many people debate the use
of military force in extremely dangerous areas, but few stop to ask those who have seen
these issues brought to life in person, whose opinion is most important reliable. Robert
Kaplan, a well-respected author and journalist, shadowed American military units
deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, among other places. As Kaplan says, “Despite news
reports of low morale in the armed services because of overdeployment, with Army Special
Forces and Marines I had met only two kinds of troops: those who were serving in Iraq and
Afghanistan, and those who were jealous of those who were” (Kaplan 2006, 323). This
statement speaks volumes to the selfless commitment and dedication of our
servicemembers and their relentless pursuit of peace and justice.
Similar sentiments can be felt from servicewomen and men in other deployments.
Incirlik Air Force Base was built approximately 250 miles southeast of Ankara, Turkey, in
1951. Today, it is one of the most important U.S. bases in the Middle East, as it provides
support to all the surrounding areas (Incirlik History). In February of 2017, the Department
of Defense published an article entitled, “Incirlik Airmen Feel Sense of Accomplishment
in Counter-ISIS Battle.” In this article, Colonel David Trucksa, commander of the 447th
Air Expeditionary Group, said that “Airmen at this crucial base in the fight against the
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria are feeling a sense of accomplishment after Iraqi ground
forces cleared eastern Mosul of the enemy” (Garamone, DOD). Incirlik, and all the
servicemembers stationed there, play a critical role in the fight against ISIS, Trucksa
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stressed, explaining, “‘At the height of the East Mosul operation, we were dropping a bomb
on an ISIS target every eight minutes, 24 hours a day’” (Garamone, DOD). The Colonel
also added that “Airmen dropped 227 bombs on ISIS targets just during President Donald
J. Trump’s inauguration on January 20” (Garamone, DOD). But the airmen there believe
in what they are doing.
“Morale stayed high because of the progress being made on the ground. ‘A
lot of people didn’t want to leave, I got a lot of people who wanted to stay
to see this through,’ Trucksa said. ‘They felt this was the most rewarding
deployment they have been on. I had no problems getting people to work
because they believe they are helping’” (Garamone, DOD).
This sense of fulfilment is compelling; if those serving on the front lines and fighting
terrorism head on believe in the effectiveness of what they are doing, who are we to
disagree?
Similarly, in an article written in August 2016, Senior Airmen John Nieves
Camacho explained how “The actions of munitions troops directly contribute to combined
OIR [Operation Inherent Resolve] accomplishments. For example, from July 24 – 30,
coalition forces conducted 159 strikes and damaged or destroyed 485 targets in Syria and
Iraq” (Camacho, USAF). Camacho explained,
“On October 15, 2014, the United States Department of Defense designated
U.S. and coalition operations as ‘Operation Inherent Resolve.’ According
to U.S. Central Command, the name Inherent Resolve ‘is intended to reflect
the unwavering resolve and deep commitment of the U.S. and partner
nations in the region and around the globe to eliminate the terrorist group
ISIL and the threat they pose to Iraq, the region and the wider international
community’” (Camacho, USAF).
This resolve and commitment is echoed by members of the United States military around
the world fighting this global war on terror. “‘It’s really beneficial knowing that what we're
doing here is the real thing,’” said Tech. Sgt. John Winn, 447th AEMXS. “‘We are saving
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lives and making an impact in the fight. It’s gratifying to hear the strike numbers that come
out and see how much of an impact we've had against ISIS’” (Camacho, USAF). Hearing
these sentiments from members of our military who are actually overseas, fighting the
terrorists we so fear, it is hard to negate that they are making a positive difference in the
war.
Not all veterans share this sentiment, of course. Some, such as the members of
Veterans for Peace (VFP) and Iraq Veterans Against the War (IVAW), do not support the
United States’ military actions abroad. Veterans for Peace is an international organization
comprised of military veterans and their allies whose goal is to educate the American public
on the true costs of war, including economic, environmental, social, human casualties,
PTSD, and suicide (VFP 2017). They profess a responsibility to seek world peace, both
nationally and internationally. Members pledge to use non-violent means to (1) educate the
public about the costs of war, (2) stop the American government from interfering in foreign
nations’ affairs, (3) end the arms race and eliminate nuclear weapons, (4) seek justice for
veterans and victims of war, and (5) abolish war as an instrument of national policy (VFP
2017).
Veterans for Peace was established in 1985 by 10 veterans, and today, seeks to
“change U.S. foreign policy from endless war to diplomacy and to help our national leaders
have a long-term vision of peace and justice” (VFP 2017). Members peacefully protest the
prevalence of Islamophobia, the use of Agent Orange during Vietnam, the current use of
drones, as well as the racial tension so rampant within our own country today. VFP also
seeks to educate young people who are discerning joining the military and urges them to
carefully consider their options. The organization warns against recruiters who will say
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anything to get young people to enlist, since they are expected to meet a quota. Veterans
for Peace does not, however, outright discourage anyone from joining the military.
Iraq Veterans Against the War was founded at a Veterans for Peace convention and
gives a voice to all those servicemen and women who have served since September 11,
2001 and oppose the war in Iraq. IVAW aims to withdraw military support of the war and
occupation in Iraq and bring the troops home now (IVAW 2017). In the eyes of the
organization, both the war in Iraq and the war in Afghanistan are illegal under international
law, and as such, their members believe that servicemen and women should have the right
to refuse to fight in such illegal wars. They support conscientious objectors and those who
are active duty and do not support the war. IVAW offers resources for active duty
servicemen and women, those considering going AWOL, veterans, and those suffering
from PTSD (IVAW 2017). They serve as a resource to any servicemember or veteran who
is against the war and seek to give all such people a voice.
Another reason that veterans or active duty service members might oppose the war
is due to the enormous loss of life that they suffer. Those who have been deployed to war
zones have seen firsthand the genuine cost of war. On August 3, 2005, Marine Lance
Corporal Travis Williams, then 22, lost his entire squad to a roadside bomb while serving
in Iraq. He had originally boarded the same vehicle as his 11 service members, when he
was ordered to ride in the second vehicle just before the caravan departed. He turned to his
friends and said, “Hey, I’ll catch you on the
flip side” (Phillips 2013). That day, he lost
11 of his closest friends, including his
squad leader Justin Hoffman, from Ohio.
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Williams recalls that Hoffman “made sure that we all remembered that we weren’t just in
that country to kill people” (Phillips 2013). Since that day, Williams has struggled with
survivor’s guilt. “I don’t feel like I’ve had a bond with somebody since these guys,”
Williams says, and he’s not sure he ever will again (Phillips 2013). Despite all he has lost,
Lance Corporal Williams says that his experience “makes me appreciate everything a lot
more” (Phillips 2013). “If every moment was a happy moment, what’s a happy moment?
It doesn’t mean anything.” (Phillips 2013). Williams continues to cope with the loss of his
friends today, as he rebuilds his life after the Marines.
Similarly, Sergeant Louis Loftus wept when speaking about a fellow soldier who
lost his life in the line of duty just the week before. “I try not to think about it,” Sergeant
Loftus said, “I pray for his family, I pray for his soul.” (Engel 2010). Loftus said he was
still numb and tried to put his emotions aside to be strong for his fellow soldiers. Sergeant
Loftus, a 22-year-old from Akron Ohio, volunteered to be the point man for his unit.
Walking in front of his fellow soldiers, he would be the first to spot an IED, which also
puts him in the most danger. But Loftus says he doesn’t allow himself to dwell on such
things. He bravely and resolvedly fights alongside others just like him, defending his
country and all that it stands for.
Silver Star Recipient Staff Sergeant David Bellavia engaged in hand-to-hand
combat with terrorists while serving in the Army in Fallujah. He supports President
Trump’s travel ban on seven Middle Eastern and North African countries, saying that we
finally have a war-time president who is taking this threat seriously. “These countries have
no centralized government, to data keeping systems at all,” Bellavia explains, which makes
tracking persons of interest extremely difficult (Bellavia 2017). The Staff Sergeant
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explained that these terrorists believe that their eternal salvation is determined by their
actions on the battlefield, and as such, they will not leave the battlefield easily. “We are
looking at this through Western eyes, [but] this is an Eastern philosophy,” Bellavia said.
“They’re going to take as many lives as they can” (Bellavia 2017). Bellavia blatantly stated
that there are 8 and 10-year-old’s who are right now preparing to continue this generational
fight. “We are never going to kill the last terrorist,” he stated, and added that it is the job
of our servicemen and women to make sure that American civilians never see what he and
other servicemembers witness on a daily basis (Bellavia 2017). “One tenth of 1% are out
there fighting this thing,” the Staff Sergeant stated, adding that, while many are glad that
America no longer institutes the draft, Bellavia believes that “we gained a sense of
entitlement and a sense of ignorance when everyone didn’t have skin in this fight” (Bellavia
2017). We need to do all we can to support and listen to those who have actually
encountered the terrorist threat themselves, for they know far better than anyone else how
to stop it.
Just as Staff Sergeant Bellavia reminds us that there are young children preparing
to continue this generational fight, Medal of Honor Recipient Florent Groberg knows that
there are young warriors sitting in kindergarten or preschool, unable to comprehend
terrorists flying planes into the World Trade Centers, but nonetheless preparing to counter
their radical ideology and defend our nation. As a Captain in the Army, Groberg and his
patrol were approached by a man during a routine patrol one night in Afghanistan on
August 8, 2012. Groberg soon realized that the man was wearing a suicide vest and threw
the man to the ground as his vest detonated. “I lost 50% of my lower left calf, lost hearing
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in my left ear, was in the hospital for 2.5 years
and had 33 surgeries,” Groberg says, “but
seeing the bodies of my fallen friends hurt
more than the injuries I suffered in the
explosion” (Groberg 2017). Four servicemen
lost their lives that day, one of whom was US
Army

Major

Tom

Kennedy.

“Before

Kennedy deployed to Afghanistan, a neighbor asked why he was returning to the battlefield
despite two previous tours in Iraq. ‘I'm a soldier,’ Kennedy replied. ‘This is what I do.’”
Groberg was born in France but moved to the U.S with his family when he was 12.
Soon after, his family received the news that Groberg’s uncle in Algeria had been killed by
Islamist extremists. “I knew that I wanted to fight against those type of individuals,” he
said (Groberg 2017). That, along with the attacks of September 11th caused him to want to
join the army. “As an immigrant, I wanted to earn my place as an American. While serving
in the military wasn't the only way to do so, I felt an intense desire to give back to a country
that had already given me so many opportunities to learn, grow and succeed” (Groberg
2017). This desire was so intense that Groberg renounced his French citizenship and joined
the American military. And give back to his country he has, in a debt that we will never be
able to repay. “I never second guessed my decision to join the service,” Groberg stated, “If
there was one sure thing in my life, it was to wear that uniform and go into combat”
(Groberg 2017). Despite the physical and emotional pain he suffered, Groberg stands firm
in his resolve to defend the United States.
“Sixteen years after the US-led coalition's invasion of Afghanistan,”
Groberg stated, “I believe America has found a new ‘Greatest Generation.’
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Without taking anything away from the patriots who fought in World War
II, Korea, Vietnam, Desert Storm and other conflicts, the current allvolunteer force will likely be forced to shoulder at least two decades of
constant war” (Groberg 2017).
Groberg’s perspective is especially unique, not only because he was born in another
country and yet chose to serve under the American flag, but also because violent extremism
hit home for his family in the murder of his uncle. “All Americans have a sacred duty to
not only spotlight the sacrifices of fallen heroes, Gold Star families, and veterans,” Groberg
said, “but also to thank the next Greatest Generation of vets. Without their willingness to
step forward in wartime, we would be at the mercy of enemies much like the evil men who
murdered my uncle and stole my friends from their loved ones” (Groberg 2017). Put more
simply, and in the words of his lost friend, “We are soldiers, and this is what we do”
(Groberg 2017).
While we will never be able to repay the sacrifice made by servicemen and women
like Captain Groberg, Staff Sergeant Bellavia, Sergeant Loftus, and Lance Corporal
Williams, as well as the gold star families who mourn the loss of their loved ones defending
our country, we can support them and show them our deep appreciation. While part of this
involves ensuring that their service is accomplishing its goals and not unnecessarily putting
their lives in undue risk, it also involves not questioning matters that people who have
never served in the military would not be best suited to answer. It involves not undermining
the opinions of those who have seen the violence with their own eyes and who have put
their own lives on the line to try to stop.
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Why Should We Care?
One might wonder, why should we have this conversation? Why do we care if the
U.S. military is an effective means of fighting terrorism? After all, our opinions have
minimal effect if any at all on our national military policy. My answer to this question in
two-fold. The first reason we should care is because Americans are agreeing that terrorism
is a growing threat to our everyday way of life. In 2014, 39% of Americans were concerned
about the possibility of a future terrorist attack in the U.S. (see Figure 34). By 2015, that
number rose to 51%. Gallup asked Americans about their level of concern for national
problems in 15 different categories, and of these 15 categories, the possibility of a terrorist
attack on U.S. soil grew the most. “With that increase in concern, terrorism became the
third-highest on the list of 15 concerns included in the list, behind only worry about
healthcare and the economy” (Newport 2015). As the fastest growing national concern,
terrorism is a topic worth researching and one on which all Americans should have an
educated opinion.
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Change in Levels of Concern (Figure 34)

Source: Gallup. http://news.gallup.com/opinion/polling-matters/186665/gallup-review-public-opinion-terrorism.aspx

In 2014, concern about terrorism was tied at 8th out of 15, behind concern for
unemployment, the economy, healthcare, size of the government, hunger and
homelessness, social security, and crime and violence. In 2015, terrorism was the third
most important concern to Americans, making it the fastest growing concern during that
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one-year period. Americans are experiencing an increased level of worry that they or
someone they know will be a victim of a terrorist attack, with 49% saying they are
somewhat or very worried (See Figure 35). This number is the highest it has been since
directly after the September 11th terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center.

Changing Concerns Regarding Becoming Victim to a Terrorist Attack (Figure 35)

Source: http://news.gallup.com/opinion/polling-matters/186665/gallup-review-public-opinion-terrorism.aspx

In a list of 8 possible threats to the United States within the next 10 years, ISIS and
international terrorism ranked first in being perceived as a critical threat. ISIS and
international terrorism were viewed by 84% of Americans surveyed as a critical threat to
the United States within the next 10 years (See Figure 36). Based on this study, Americans
see ISIS as more of a threat than Iran’s nuclear weapons, the militaries of North Korea and
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Russia, the volatile conflicts between Russia and Ukraine and Palestine and Israel, and the
economic prowess of China.

Critical and Important International Threats (Figure 36)

Source: http://news.gallup.com/opinion/polling-matters/186665/gallup-review-public-opinion-terrorism.aspx

Additionally, our actions domestically and abroad effect our foreign relations with
other countries, as well as how citizens of those countries view not only the American
government, but Americans themselves. As Figure 37 shows, 52% of Muslims in Turkey
held a favorable view of the U.S. in the year 2000, but in 2003 that number dropped to
15%. In 2000, 77% of Muslim Moroccans viewed America favorably, but by 2004, that
number dropped to 27%. And in 2003, only 1% of Jordanian Muslims held a favorable
view of the United States. In an age where many people receive their information from the
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media and do not bother to research such topics themselves, perception and image play a
crucial role in diplomacy. More often than not, perception is reality.

Muslims with a Favorable View of the United States (Figure 37)

Source: Pape, 2005, 243.

The second part of the answer to the question ‘Why should we care?’ is of a more
humanitarian nature. We should care about thwarting terrorism not only to protect
ourselves and our country, but also to protect those living under terrorist regimes, such as
when ISIS had control of Mosul and Raqqa. People are suffering, and I believe that it is
our moral responsibility as human beings to do everything in our power to alleviate that
suffering. Because of this, it is our duty to discover what is plausible and implausible when
the military is involved, and based on that answer, whether or not using military force is in
fact the best way to achieve these ends. Through
BBC’s extensive reporting and coverage of the
liberation of Mosul, the international community
is afforded a unique look into life under the ISIS

Source: BBC. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uxtJzbT-MT0
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regime. BBC’s Yalda Hakim traveled to Mosul and shared some of the heartbreaking
stories she heard there. At the height of the liberation, doctors in Mosul were treating 700
patients a day. Not only from shrapnel wounds and injuries, but also from diseases caused
by a lack of sanitation and clean drinking water. The only functioning hospital in Mosul
also has very primitive security, and doctors and patients alike fear the possibility of an
ISIS attack within the hospital. “One of [ISIS’s] goals is to bring ignorance as well as
hunger and oppression,” one doctor explained (BBC Newsnight). He recounted how he
was forced to treat ISIS fighters, or else they would
come back and take his family. Everyone in the city
lived in constant fear and focused only on survival.
“This is what liberation looks like,”

Source: BBC.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uxtJzbT-MT0

Hakim said, staring out over the ruins of the city, “trapped beneath these ruins are untold
numbers of bodies” (BBC Newsnight 2017). In 2014, when ISIS took control of the city,
many saw the act as a liberation from the oppressive Shia government. Today, however,
the city is utterly destroyed. As if the fighting wasn’t enough, retreating ISIS fighters have
rigged 90% of the city’s buildings with IED’s. Hakim interviewed a mother and children
who had been captured by ISIS. The caliphate captured their husband and father, as well
as his siblings. The widow cried as she recounted how her husband begged and pleaded to
just be allowed to see his wife and children one last time. “They want their father to be
around just like any child would. But he’s gone” (BBC Newsnight 2017).

Source: BBC. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uxtJzbT-MT0
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Source: BBC. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uxtJzbT-MT0

At Hamam al-Alil camp for internally displaced persons (IDP’s), terrified civilians
are coming by the thousands every day. Families, children, and orphans arrive by bus,
avoiding ISIS sniper fire and air strikes along the way. Once in the camp, men and women
are separated in order to ensure that the men are not ISIS rebels or sympathizers. Twelveyear-old Mohammad arrived with his two brothers. At the make shift school, he played
outside with other young boys his age. He told BBC that ISIS had killed his father, then
also killed his mother when she had tried to flee with her sons (BBC News 2017). BBC
also talked with Omar, who, with his wife and two young daughters, had left all of their
possessions in West Mosul and quietly escaped in the dead of night. Omar wept as he spoke
with BBC, saying that he cannot wait for ISIS to be out of Mosul for good, and that God
will have revenge of ISIS and all of its sympathizers (BBC News 2017).

Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Uyh0LwJeU9g
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Another man recounted how under the rule of ISIS, phone calls and Internet use
were banned, and if the rebels could prove that someone was guilty of breaking the rules,
they were either imprisoned of killed on spot (BBC News 2017). Eight-year-old Shiva’s
family of 7 arrived recently at the IDP camp. She explained how they were scared getting
to the camp but were happy to be there. Shiva recounted what school was like under the
rule of the Islamic State. “They beat us because we were not wearing headscarves or niqabs
and because I had nail polish. I don’t even know how to wear them. They forced us” (BBC
News). Shiva is looking forward to returning home so that she can continue her studies.
She wants more than anything to be a journalist. BBC also interviewed a family who lived
under ISIS for 2 years. The oldest sister described how ISIS came into their house one night
and they all hid. She cried as she looked around at her family, horrified at the thought of
what ISIS could have done to them. After that night, they fled, but today are back in their
home. All of their possessions are gone; everything that they have now they have had to
steal. Their part of the city still has no running water and no electricity. The young woman
explained that being declared free of ISIS does not necessarily mean that they are free. And
there are still an estimated 400,000 trapped in amongst the fighting in West Mosul (BBC
News 2017).

Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7pla96hiXDY
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But those who inflict such suffering are not always monsters, sometimes they are
victims themselves. BBC was given exclusive access to interview a captured suicide
bomber in 2015. The young man was blind folded and escorted into an interrogation room
by a heavily armed guard. This captured suicide bomber, tasked with killing women and
children for ISIS, was 17 years old. He explained that most of the suicide bombers ISIS
uses are his age and even younger. Some, as young as 14. This young man was homeless
when ISIS found him, strapped a bomb to his chest, and thrust a detonator into his hand.
He explained that they showed him how to use the detonator, and “they promised me I’d
go straight to Heaven” (BBC News 2015). The cruel reality of ISIS is that they use victims
to create more victims. Many have nothing left to live for and feel as though they have no
other way out. ISIS feeds off the destruction and
desperation that it creates and uses them to
further fuel its malicious organization. As he
was interviewed, the young man began to cry.
When asked why he was crying, he responded

Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UYZ-Xd0-cjY

only, “I am so sorry” (BBC News 2015).
These are the people living under the constant threat of terrorism. Children.
Mothers. Fathers. Widows. Orphans. Doctors. Teachers. Students. Humans. They are the
reason we must critically examine how we are ‘fighting’ terrorism. These individuals are
not just numbers and statistics. They are names and faces. They are people. They are
individuals with families and lives and hopes and dreams just like our own. These
individuals are the reason we must evaluate if our actions are helping or hurting the
situation abroad, because quite simply, their lives hang in the balance. When some ask,
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‘why should we care about terrorism?’ I ask, how can we not? How dare we as humans not
look into their faces, learn their names, listen to their stories, reach out to help them? It is
our moral responsibility to ask questions, to challenge assumptions, to ensure that our
American military presence abroad is in fact helping to ease the burden of those living
through this atrocity and not making it worse. Those who refuse to help due to religious
differences do not know the true meaning of religion. Those who refuse to help due to
political affiliation have forgotten the true purpose of politics. Those who refuse to help
due to cultural or sectarian differences must be reminded that we are all one human race.
We should care because we are human, and so are those suffering due to terrorism. No
further reason is needed.

Possible Solutions:
Ending the Reign of Terror:
Given all of this information, what do we do now? What can ‘we’ the United States,
or ‘we’ individuals living in the U.S. do to end the reign of terrorism in our lifetimes?
Terrorism may seem endless while we are in the midst of fighting it, but as Audrey Cronin
reminds us, terrorism always ends (Cronin 2009, 1). One school of thought believes that
terrorists organizations will inevitably collapse in upon themselves. Even so, there are
several things the U.S. can do to expedite this process. Dr. Nelly Lahoud, Associate
Professor at West Point and Senior Associate at the Combatting Terrorism Center of West
Point, believes that if left to their own devices, international jihadists will bring about their
own demise. “Since either internal or external factors can lead to the end of a terrorist
organization, the relevant question in this case is: how can the United States best use
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external factors to precipitate the collapse of AQAM along its internal fault lines?” (Groves
2012, 30). As Pape points out, this can be done by poking holes in the logic used by terrorist
organizations.
The United States casually throws around the term ‘radical Islam,’ implying that
all Muslims share identical ideologies, and that there is only one sect of Islam. This is
simply not the case. Just as there are many different denominations of Christianity, so too
are there different sects of Islam. These Islamist terrorists seem to be united under the
banner of wanting to form an Islamic State, no matter the cost, but they do not have any
plans in place if such a state were to be established, probably because there would be
dissent among the terrorist community as to how the state should function, who should
rule, and which sect of Islam would be enforced. “Hezbollah and Hamas have each waged
numerous suicide terrorist campaigns against Israel, but never for each other and never at
the same time. Al-Qaeda has never attacked Israel at all, while Hamas has never attacked
the United States, and Hezbollah has attacked only Americans in Lebanon” (Pape 2005,
243). Put simply, these groups are all lumped together under the term ‘terrorist
organizations,’ but they do not work together now, and they would not work together in
the future either. Spreading this message to recruiting cites and terrorist networks could
put pressure on the internal fault lines and cause a quicker demise of such seemingly
ubiquitous organizations.
Modern day terrorism is unique in two ways: it is regenerative, the numbers of these
groups continue to grow despite successful operations against top level leaders; and its
mere existence threatens our safety, many believe that the world will not be safe until all
these groups are not only defeated, but entirely eliminated. “Al Qaeda is an idea as much
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as an organization and even if one were to decimate the organization as currently structured
there will always be an incentive on the part of others to restart under the ‘ﬂag’ of Al
Qaeda” (McIntosh 2014, 27). The idea of ending terrorism remains a lofty goal because
“so long as Al Qaeda merely exists it remains ‘un-defeated’” (McIntosh 2014, 28). While
these statements might sound daunting and cynical, it only means that, because this is not
a conventional ‘war,’ it cannot be ‘won’ in a conventional way. “Whether through ceaseﬁre, peace treaty, articles of surrender, or something else entirely, wars end because both
sides decide to stop ﬁghting. And a war that cannot end cannot be won” (McIntosh 2014,
28). America must turn her attention to not only winning the war, but more specifically, to
ending it.

The Ways Terrorism Ends:
As Audrey Cronin eloquently explains, all those who fight against terrorism must
turn our attention not to the next attack, but rather to the very last attack (Cronin, 2009, 6).
Cronin emphasizes the importance of stopping the spread of terrorism not only because it
carries with it the possibility of killing large numbers of civilians, but also because it carries
with it the potential of threatening and changing states and state systems. Cronin outlines
6 main ways she has encountered in her extensive research that terrorist groups have ended
in the past: capturing or killing the leader, entry of the terrorist group into legitimate
political processes, achievement of the group’s aims, loss of the group’s public support,
defeat by brute force, and transition to other forms of violence. Cronin makes very astute
observations regarding these ends to terrorism and the inevitable downfall of al-Qaeda,
most of which can also be more broadly applied to ISIS and other terrorist groups in the
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Middle East. She argues that these groups will not be ended by capturing or killing the
leader; the death of Osama bin Laden has shown that. While some would argue that killing
individuals achieves a modicum of justice, these terrorist groups have shown that they are
larger than just the individuals who comprise and lead them. The death of bin Laden
“catalyzed a movement” larger than him alone, because the ideological issues and rage that
lie at the heart of the al-Qaeda movement are larger than just one man. In killing bin Laden,
the American people might have achieved justice, but our actions may well have been
counter-productive, as other leaders rushed in to fill the void, spurred on by the desire to
avenge their leader’s death (Cronin 2009, 194-195).
Similarly, Cronin argues that al-Qaeda will not end by succeeding in its aims,
mainly because its aims have changed over time. Through her research, Cronin found that
terrorist groups who have succeeded in achieving their aims have done so by having clear
and limited aims. Al-Qaeda’s aims, on the other hand, have been riddled with divisions and
inconsistencies, such as whether or not to seek compromise, whether or not it is acceptable
to kill Muslims, and whether or not to attack the economy of Muslim states, just to name a
few (Cronin 2009, 184). Al-Qaeda, as Cronin sees it, is a manifestation of the civil war
“within Islam over the ideology that will prevail among Muslims,” as more often than not,
members share more accord “about what they are against than about what they are for”
(Cronin 2009, 187). If members of their own group cannot agree upon their goals and aims,
it will be impossible for these aims to be achieved in an international arena.
Negotiations, or the entrance of the terrorist organization into legitimate political
means, is a viable option according to Cronin, not with the head leadership of al-Qaeda,
but rather with splinter groups who have recently joined under the banner al-Qaeda hoists.
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Offering a way out to disgruntled members would undermine the fortitude of the
organization and would provide us with invaluable intelligence. Announcing an alternative
to death would sow distrust among the organization’s members and would require
increased resources and prowess when seeking new recruits. Additionally, treating
captured members extremely well, publicizing their treatment, and possibly even releasing
them back into their cells would undermine the mentality that the United States is the
barbaric enemy seeking to destroy all Muslims, as al-Qaeda would like its members to
believe (Cronin 2009, 186).
It is no coincidence, Cronin states, that bin Laden’s ideology relied so heavily upon
other areas of cultural tension, such as anti-imperialism, anti-globalization, antiAmericanization, anti-Westernization, and anti-modernization. “They tap into a wellspring
of anger, frustration, humiliation, and resentment that has built up over the decades of
failure for political Islam,” which has been “brilliantly channeled” into a discourse about
the overthrow of un-Islamic governments, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the
presence of Western troops in the Holy Lands (Cronin 2009, 180). Al-Qaeda has
transformed their anger, and that of many Muslims, into a conspiracy that Christians and
Jews are out to destroy all Muslims, or rather, America and its Western allies versus the
Muslims people. Because of this well-crafted discourse, negotiations must be directed at
the periphery of the group rather than at its pith. Doing so would have the greatest chance
for success and would also cut away al-Qaeda’s support system (Cronin 2009, 180).
This leaves 3 other options, as proposed by Cronin: loss of public support, defeat
by brute force, and transition of the group into other forms of violence. The latter is the
most concerning, as such terrorist groups could move toward insurgency, conventional
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war, “or even catalyzing systematic war between major powers” (Cronon 2009, 195).
While this might end the terrorist group in its conventional name as the group transfers into
something else, this option would be just as bad, if not worse. This option is especially
dangerous because of its potential to draw multiple countries into an all-out war. The
diminution of public support is foreseeable according to Cronin, provided that America
and the West emphasize the discontinuity within the terrorist movement itself. Common
ways that terrorist groups have lost public support are: the ideology becomes irrelevant,
the groups lose contact with ‘the people,’ and targeting’s by the groups receive backlash
by the group’s followers (Cronin 2009, 187).
The United States and the West must hone in on these options to weaken al-Qaeda
and ISIS as much as possible. An example of this is when in 1993, a 12-year-old girl was
killed in an attempted assassination of the Egyptian prime minister by the terrorist group,
Islamic Jihad, led by Ayman Zawahiri, bin Laden’s Egyptian partner. The prime minister
was only minorly injured, but the death of the young girl outraged the Egyptian people, so
much so that they took to the streets chanting ‘Terrorism is the enemy of God!’ The
crackdown and arrests that followed in Egypt wiped out Zawahiri’s entire operation in the
country (Cronin 2009, 189). The West must focus on instances like these and show the
Muslim community that al-Qaeda is not protecting them but rather is putting them at further
risk. In attacks for which al-Qaeda has claimed responsibility, more than 1/3 of those killed
were Muslims. (Cronin 2009, 190). These attacks are supposed to protest Muslim
oppression, but in reality, are only furthering it. By stressing this point, the West could
seriously enervate support for such terrorist organizations.
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This leaves repression, or the strategy of crushing terrorism with brute force. As
Cronin points out, while our military has made important strides by killing senior level
officials, al-Qaeda continues to grow and adapt, demonstrating the limits of this tactic. “As
with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the threat will merely evolve and reappear
elsewhere” (Cronin 2009, 194). This is especially true when terrorism is publicly justified
altruistically, as the pursuit of public good over one man’s vendetta for revenge. Terrorist
groups target states, and when states respond in kind, the terrorists’ actions become
justified in the eyes of their followers. Cronin points to another approach for combatting
terrorism: deterrence by denial. Cronin argues that all too often we assume that terrorists
are incoherent individuals, blinded by rage, who impulsively act without thought.
However, these individuals consider the costs, benefit, and consequences of their actions.
The best way to deter terrorism is to convince terrorists that their goals cannot be achieved
by terror attacks, that is, deterrence not by punishment, but by denial (Cronin 2009, 120).
The key, Cronin states, is to gain a knowledge of what the terrorist group wants, and to
ensure, at all costs, that the state does not concede in any way to them. While the military
may be able to assist in this aim, it would not be able to achieve it on its own.

Measuring Success:
To set such a goal requires empirical standards and data that can be gathered in
order to measure the success or failure of such an operation. “But how will we know when
we are succeeding? Daniel Byman lists three semi tangible indications of success in this
war: (1) low levels of death, (2) the level of fear is reduced, and (3) counterterrorism is
done at an acceptable cost” (Groves 2012, 31). Clearly, these points are still idiosyncratic.
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Would the low levels of death apply only to civilians, or to the terrorists as well? Who
would objectively and in an unbiased manner collect this data? How would a reduction in
fear be measured? And what would qualify as an ‘acceptable cost’ for counterterrorism?
Would it be in relation to the U.S. or the whole world? Who would define the term and
how would it be measured? These quantitative goals are still themselves subjective, but
they are a good starting point. Department of Homeland Security head Jeh Johnson added
that terrorism will end
“Once we have reached a ‘tipping point,’ where ‘so many leaders and
operatives’ of Al Qaeda have been captured or killed that the organization
‘is no longer able to attempt or launch a strategic attack against the United
States.’ Once that has been achieved, ‘Al Qaeda as we know it’ will have
been ‘effectively destroyed’ and the threat from Al Qaeda will have been
eliminated” (McIntosh 2014, 27).
Of course, this is easier said than done. There are, however, several options to America’s
counterterrorism strategy that merit strong consideration.

Auxiliary Fighters:
One possible solution to fighting terrorism and radicalization while still lessening
America’s military footprint abroad is to employ the use of auxiliaries, or local partisan
fighters. As UK Defense Secretary Michael Fallon stated, the war against ISIS “‘can only
be won on the ground, but it can also only be won by a home army, not by America or
Britain’” (Scheipers 2015, 121). To this end, he says, “occupation by Western forces had
ostensibly triggered full-blown insurgencies,” when resources would have been better
spent training local forces to fight these terrorist groups themselves (Scheipers 2015, 121).
The alternative to outside military powers coming into the region, Scheipers argues, is the
use of auxiliary forces, “local militia and rebel groups that are willing to bear the brunt of
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the fighting, with Western support in terms of materiel, communications and, possibly,
airstrikes” (Scheipers 2015, 122). The argument that terrorism can more efficiently be
defeated by local armies rather than foreign ones is valid. Fighters who have grown up in
the area would have vastly more knowledge of the terrain, language, and culture, than any
foreign entity, no matter how researched that entity might be.
However, local forces are usually unequipped militarily to face terrorist groups
alone. There is also the risk of the auxiliary forces changing sides, either voluntarily or
involuntarily if the terrorist groups threaten the families of the rebel fighters. In Iraq, the
Iraqi Civil Defense Corps members were reported to be deserting in droves. As an observer
aptly stated, “I had found that the ICDC and the Iraqi police were loyal where the
Americans were strong and disloyal where there was a perception of American weakness”
(Kaplan 2006, 348). To make this statement is to allude that the American presence is at
least somewhat effective in deterring the violence, if local forces will stand by the
American military when it has a strong presence in the region. We must also stop to decide
at what point violence begets more violence, and the use of rebel forces becomes
counterproductive.
Additionally, while some believe that decreasing military visibility within a host
country would be beneficial in the fight against terrorism, as Baker points out, “A small,
shadowy presence does not have the same opportunity to develop a positive public face
through constructive participation in host society traditions and culture” (Baker xiii, 2004).
Hiding our military will not dispel rumors or negative sentiments, on the contrary, it might
increase them. A more effective way of showing civilians that we are not the imperialist
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barbarians they are taught to fear is to increase our interactions with them, not to lurk in
the shadows of their cities.
The term ‘rebel’ has embodied different meanings throughout the ages. It wasn’t
until 2011, when NATO supported the local resistance against Muammar Gadhafi that the
term took on a more positive meaning.
“Western governments had recognized the National Transitional Council as
Libya’s new legitimate government. Western policymakers and the media
referred to the anti-Gadhafi forces as ‘rebels’, thereby turning a word that
in the nineteenth century had been a term of abuse for illegitimate guerrilla
fighters into a badge of honor and a conspicuous symbol of political
legitimacy” (Scheipers 2015, 127).
Similarly, in the fight against ISIS, the Kurdish peshmerga, have “evolved into Iraq’s most
effective fighting force,” with training and assistance from the U.S. (Scheipers 2015, 130).
The danger, of course, comes if and when these ‘trusted’ local forces abuse Western
friendship in order to obtain arms and weapons for ulterior motives.
“The current debate on the forms that such collaboration could take, and the
risks it would involve, is overwhelmingly focused on the vetting of Syrian
rebel groups with a view to establishing their degree of religious extremism,
and on debating the danger of weapons falling into the wrong hands”
(Scheipers 2015, 133).
Using auxiliary forces also employs more of a band-aid approach, rather than addressing
the root causes of terrorism, such as the power vacuum created by weak governments and
resentment created by American military missteps. While the use of local ‘rebel’ forces
may be crucial to the downfall of ISIS, the risks involved are extensive and should not be
underestimated.
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Changes Within:
In addition to aiding other countries, the United States can make several substantial
improvements domestically. One such change could be in how our country approaches this
fight to combat terrorism.
“In the case of the United States for instance, it could treat the threat
primarily as a legal issue rather than as a war and therefore a problem of
law enforcement. Alternatively, the United States could let the intelligence
community take the lead and emphasize intelligence gathering and covert
operations rather than military force. A State Department–led approach
could focus efforts around public diplomacy and managing media outlets or
social networks in order to identify and undermine Al Qaeda’s public
support and message” (McIntosh 2014, 31).
Obviously, there are advantages and disadvantages to each of these approaches. Treating
terrorism as a legal issue is difficult because terrorist groups such as ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and
the Taliban are non-state actors, and therefore cannot be prosecuted for their crimes under
international law. Intelligence gathering is undoubtedly valuable, but it takes time, and still
requires a measure of security to protect the officers gathering the intelligence. Focusing
our energy on social media holds the most potential because it is the least explored option
to date. If America can change the narrative, we increase our possibility of wining hearts
and minds. While none of these approaches are a perfect solution, it is worth discussing
alternative options to our current methods of operation.

As a Legal Matter:
One option to combatting terrorism would be to treat it as a legal matter, using law
enforcement to stop it’s spread. “A law enforcement approach, on the other hand, treats
terrorism as an ongoing threat to be managed, not eradicated” (McIntosh 2014, 32). This
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method realizes that terrorism will continue indefinitely, but measures costs and benefits
to find the most apt solution, rather than solely focusing on absolute victory. Taking a law
enforcement approach to counter terrorism would also put more effort on capturing,
arresting and prosecuting individuals rather than killing them. While critics claim that the
U.S. is too quick to shoot first and ask questions later, citing the fact that wanted individuals
are worth more to us alive than dead because of the information they might provide, we
must remember that the situation in hostile territories is not usually so black and white.
While it is true that captured individuals might be able to provide relevant information,
often times they do not. It is extremely difficult for someone who has never served before
to tell America’s servicemen and women how to do their jobs. Americans should have faith
in their military, and trust that all those who put their lives on the line for ours every day
did what they thought was best in that moment. It is the least we can do to thank them for
their service.

Focusing on Intelligence:
Another option in the fight against terrorism would be to have an intelligencecentered approach, rather than a military one.
“Much like the legal approach, a strategy that was primarily intelligence
oriented would seek to gather intelligence and penetrate organizations in
order to gain information to thwart plots as well as manipulate these
organizations from the inside rather than pursue the physical elimination of
individuals at every opportunity” (McIntosh 2014, 32).
This approach would still involve force, but it would greatly diminish the number of
civilian casualties incurred in the fight against terrorism. The downside, of course, is that
infiltrating these organizations would take years of planning, with extremely high risk
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involved. Even if the United States could train and implant undercover agents into these
terrorist organizations, in the time it takes to get an operation like this up and running, we
risk being vulnerable and unaware of future attacks. This would also involve strengthening
communication skills and language proficiencies within the military and its contractors. As
Robert Kaplan noted while shadowing American military units in Afghanistan and Iraq,
“Here was where the American Empire, such as it was, was weakest. With all of its
technology and willingness to send the most enterprising of its soldiers to the most distant
parts of the world, it was woefully incompetent in linguistic skills, especially in places and
in situations where it counted the most” (Kaplan 2006, 235). In order to solve this problem,
we must first be able to communicate with those experiencing it firsthand. To do this, we
must place a higher precedent on critical language development and cultural awareness.

Winning Hearts and Minds:
One of the most important ways to combat terrorism is to win the hearts and minds
of not only the people living in the Middle East, but also of Muslims around the world.
This can happen both in and out of the war zones. When an 11-year-old boy stepped on a
Soviet land mine outside of Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan, medics quickly went to work
saving the boy’s life. As one major on base noted, “That’s the gold standard . . . what that
boy tells people back in his village about how the Americans helped him” (Kaplan 2006,
236). If the United States can decrease the numbers of radicalized individuals who join the
cause, if we focus as much energy on countering radicalization as we focus on countering
terrorism, we can significantly enervate the strength of terrorist groups. “The United States
must therefore work with its regional partners to capture or kill violent Islamist extremists
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who threaten U.S. interests while addressing the causes of radicalization in the Middle East
that are creating the next generation of Islamist terrorists” (Bowman 2008, 80). One of
ISIS’s major strengths is its ability to radicalize globally, through the use of the Internet.
This terrorist group had an uncanny ability to find individuals sympathetic to the cause and
rally them behind their so-called banner of Islam. In order to counter terrorism, we must
also counter radicalization. “In the long term and from a strategic perspective, it is critical
that the United States work with its allies and Muslim nations to address grievances,
counter militant ideology, and disrupt the movement’s ability to mobilize individuals for
violence. This will be the means for long-term ‘victory’ against international terrorists”
(Groves 2012, 33). Figure 38 is a visual representation of Groves’ interpretation of the
challenges posed by radical ideologies, as well as actions communities and governments
can take to combat this process.
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Radicalization Flowchart (Figure 38)

Source: Groves, Bryan.
http://eds.b.ebscohost.com/eds/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=2&sid=25907d71-0c35-4ad7-b784-a4fe73dd1b84%40sessionmgr120

The Silent Majority:
Another powerful tool at America’s disposal for combatting terrorism is “the silent
Muslim majority” (Groves 2012, 35) living within the United States. We have next to no
hope of winning hearts and minds abroad if we cannot win the hearts and minds of those
already living within our boarders.
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“Domestically, American ofﬁcials at all levels need to reach out to build
trust with Muslim leaders and communities, empowering them at the local
levels to craft their own narratives, identities, mentor and police their own,
and to thank them for their patriotism. After all, two out of ﬁve Al Qaeda
attacks plotted against the U.S. homeland since 9/11 have been thwarted
with the help of the American Muslim community; within the last 2 years,
that number soars to 75 percent” (Groves 2012, 33).
Additionally, “A Zogby poll found that 79 percent of American Muslims were registered
to vote and 96 percent favored participation in civic life. The vast majority of American
Muslims were appalled by terrorist attacks; all of these people have a huge stake in the
future welfare of America” (Nydell 2006, 133). America must cultivate trusting and
respectful relationships with its Muslim population, both on local levels and at the national
level. “This narrative should remind the Muslim world of the evil Al Qaeda has perpetrated
and challenge its assertion that armed jihad is the only solution” (Groves 2012, 33). As
figure 39 shows, when the survey was conducted in 2004, only 13% of Americans viewed
Muslims very favorably, 35% viewed them somewhat favorably, and 32% viewed Muslims
unfavorably (PEW 2004). While this data is outdated, it is plain to see that this area is one
in which we can make significant growth, and one in which we all should strive to improve.
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Favorability ratings of Muslims and Christians by Country (Figure 39)

Source: PEW Research 2004: http://www.people-press.org/2004/03/16/a-year-after-iraq-war/

Local Leaders:
In addition to the Silent Muslim Majority, another untapped potential in
America’s fight against terrorism is utilizing the influence of local Muslims leaders
in America.
“Domestically, public and private stakeholders alike need to make serious,
coordinated, and lasting efforts to engage communities, Muslim and
otherwise, and to both dispute the message of radical Islamic extremists and
to offer a viable alternative. The focus needs to be on local actors who know
the human landscape and understand the nuanced dynamics of their city
better than those that sit in Washington, D.C” (Groves 2012, 35).
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Groves emphasizes that local leaders must work towards teaching their communities how
to recognize extremists’ views, discredit them, and implement peaceful conflict resolution,
especially among the young Muslim populations. The government should not tell Muslims
which Imams or religious leaders to talk to, for they will resent this. The best source of
peace, according to Groves, is a radical Imam who directs his followers to “political
discourse and social mobilization” rather than violence (Groves 2012, 35). The Muslim
community is an invaluable resource in America’s counter terrorism strategy and should
be treated as such.

Diplomacy in Action:
The United States can also strengthen diplomatic relations and encourage the
governments of these countries where terrorism is rampant to strengthen their economies
and societies in order to increase stability in these regions and debunk the idea that
terrorism was an individual’s only option for income or survival.
“By significantly reducing the U.S. military footprint that often fuels
radicalization and by using U.S. political and economic power to encourage
oil-producing governments to diversify their economies, invest in their
people, and progress gradually toward constitutional liberalism, the United
States can reduce the likelihood of domestic instability or revolution that
would threaten an oil-producing ally” (Bowman 2008, 81-82).
Diplomacy becomes difficult, of course, when local and national governments are
weak, corrupt, or unwilling to admit that terrorism is a serious problem within their
country. Using diplomacy offers a peaceful and tactful solution to otherwise messy
problems, but it can only be used successfully when both parties are willing to make
a change.
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Follow the Money:
Finances are also a key factor when countering terrorism. This approach is twofold, in that efforts must be made to both deplete the financial resources of terrorist
organizations, as well as strengthen the economies of countries fighting to stop its spread.
“As for squeezing the ﬁnancial lifeblood of global jihadis, ‘international counterterrorism
efforts to control Al Qaeda ﬁnancing have been robust, including important initiatives
under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373, efforts that have frozen at least $147 million
in assets’” (Groves 2012, 32-33). But because of underground systems like the black
market, terrorist organizations have several methods of liquidating assets that legal entities
such as the U.N. have difficulty tracking and stopping. “America also needs to strengthen
its economy and prioritize its spending to ensure its long-term solvency, there by
preserving its ability to pursue terrorists globally, indeﬁnitely, and with state of the art
technology (Groves 2012, 33). Often times this detail is overlooked. While one way to
combat terrorism includes focusing on strengthening the economies of nations where
terrorism is prevalent, thereby lessening radicalization, we must also focus on our own
economy.
Rebuilding the American economic infrastructure is equally as important in
countering terrorism, because our economy and nation must always remain ready and
prepared to combat terrorism with the best and most advanced tools possible. “The United
States must strengthen its national resiliency, adopting and educating its citizenry regarding
appropriate expectations of success, how long it will take, and how to respond to the next
major terrorist attack that is successful” (Groves 2012, 33). While this may be a cynical
outlook, America would benefit greatly from creating and practicing an emergency plan of
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action to ensure that no one is caught off guard in the event of another tragedy. We must
continue to prepare for the worst and hope for the best.

We Will Rise Again:
One final take away from this research is that an emphasis must be placed on
rebuilding the countries we enter. A shift must occur that saves a significant amount of
resources and funds for the years after the ‘victory,’ when the unfavorable government has
been deposed and terror no longer walks freely in the streets. Putting a greater focus on
rebuilding countries through humanitarian aid would create a positive image of America
to people who have only ever seen the United States as an aggressor. It would challenge
the terrorists’ claims that America is malevolent and should be feared if Americans stayed
to help rebuild countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan alongside the Iraqis and Afghanis
who lived through the war we participated in. Doing so would lessen radicalization, but
more importantly, it would be the right thing to do.
Too often, victory is declared before the hard part of the operation is even
attempted: building up a country that has repeatedly been torn down. America must focus
on rebuilding the war-torn countries so as to establish solid governmental, healthcare,
economic and educational systems in order that the country will not revert back to a system
of violence and fear. Frustration grew in Iraq after Saddam Hussein’s regime fell because,
while the Americans could oust a totalitarian regime, something many believed to be
impossible, they could not provide running water to the villages or organize garbage
collection. One lieutenant and his platoon distributed bottled water to every person in the
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village. “As he later admitted, it was a well-intentioned but ineffectual action. But he felt
that he just had to do something” (Kaplan 2006, 343).

Conclusion:
“History may not repeat itself, nor even rhyme, but it does provide us with a rich
store of evidence from which we can distil an analytical vocabulary that can help us
understand current events. Viewed from this perspective, the study of history cannot offer
solutions, but it can help us ask pertinent questions” (Scheipers 2015, 123). This paper does
not attempt to answer the question, ‘how do we win the war on terror?’ It does, however,
strive to ask important questions related to this goal. Based on the evidence presented in
this research, it is clear that increased U.S. military intervention does not correlate to or
cause an immediate increase in terrorism. It is worth noting, however, that in the cases of
Iraq and Afghanistan, even after the U.S. military left the country or pulled out substantial
numbers of troops, instances of terror were still more prevalent than before the U.S.
entered. This could point to a trend that American military presence in a country leads to
more radicalization and violence in the long term, one year, five years or ten years down
the road. This pattern requires more research and open source data to fully investigate, and
since such data was not available for Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain, no conclusive
arguments can be drawn from this data alone.
Globally, acts of terror seem to be most present and more deplorable every time
they happen. And every time they happen, we ask ourselves, how can we stop this? To
those who argue that the U.S. military involvement is making matters worse, I would
respond that the numbers do not support that claim. Both military personnel abroad and
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American citizens at home believe that military intervention is an effective way to fight
terrorism. Terrorism is not a recent development. It has been written in the pages of our
history books for ages. To truly put an end to the violence, we must also work to improve
the education, healthcare, and economies of these countries where terrorism is rampant.
We must win the hearts and minds of those affected by the violence, and practice respect
and compassion at every opportunity. But these diplomatic and peaceful means must also
be implemented along with military force, to show those who wish us harm that the world
will not fall to fear. Rather, that we will come together to stand up for those who cannot
stand for themselves, and fight for peace and justice until every person is free to live a life
of dignity and respect, free from fear, just as we all deserve.

“I raise up my voice not so that I can shout, but so that those without a voice can be
heard.”
- Malala Yousafzai
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